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IMPERIALISM
AND
CIVILIZATION

By the Same Author:

THE VILLAGE IN THE JUNGLE.

ESSAYS ON LITERATURE, HISTORY, AND POLITICS.

IMPERIALISM AND CIVILIZATION

BY

LEONARD WOOLF

"Men moralise among ruins"

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I

INTRODUCTORY

Between 1800 and 1900 Europe passed through a revolution that was both internal and external. The European civilization of feudalism, of monarchy and aristocracy, of privilege, of the horse and the stage-coach and candle-light, a civilization which had its roots far back in the centuries, passed away. It was destroyed partly by the folly of kings and the stupidity of aristocrats, partly by the French Revolution, and partly by the industrial revolution. What took its place we now call Western or European civilization, the civilization of democracy and universal suffrage, of the factory and the machine, the railway, motor-car, and aeroplane, the telegraph, telephone, and electric light.

But this tremendous change in the internal constitution of Europe and in the fabric of its civili-

zation was accompanied, or quickly followed, by an equally important change in the relation of Europe to the rest of the world. The political, industrial, economic and mental processes to which I have referred were confined to the peoples inhabiting Europe and North America, a very small proportion of the world's inhabitants. In the vast continents of Asia and Africa, in Australia and South America, there was no French Revolution and no industrial revolution, and there was no reaction to them in the minds or institutions of the men of those continents. Between 1750 and 1850 the development in Europe was equivalent, one may say, to the step from the Stone to the Bronze Age, or, if you prefer it, from the Golden to the Iron Age. In the same one hundred years the Asiatic and the African remained where he was; he lived the same life and did the same things and thought the same thoughts as his fathers had done for centuries before him.

The world is a fairly large place and has been running its extremely peculiar course for a considerable time. It is not the first time in its history

that civilizations of a widely different kind have existed simultaneously upon its surface. Nothing could be more dissimilar than the civilizations of Greece, Egypt, and Palestine, yet for long they continued to develop side by side, each on its own lines and with little interference from the others. It is possible that my ancestors were listening, rather unwillingly, I imagine, to the Prophet Isaiah when the ancestors of most of my readers were savages who painted themselves blue, but neither had any contact with or effect upon the other. Even in the eighteenth century the civilizations and barbarisms of Europe, Asia, and Africa each pursued its own immemorial path, with occasional wars and clashes, with an erratic and spasmodic interchange of ideas or religions, of spices or woollen goods, but on the whole with tolerance and indifference.

But the new European civilization of the nineteenth century changed all that. It was a belligerent, crusading, conquering, exploiting, proselytizing civilization. Various causes contributed to give it this menacing form. Its mechanical inven-

tions, which have now substituted the aeroplane for the horse as the fastest means of transport, have, as many people point out, drawn the world together and made of it a very narrow place. The closer people live together, the more often do they tread on one another's toes, marry one another's daughters, or exchange one another's ideas. Right up to the nineteenth century difficulties of communication and transport effectively isolated and often protected continent from continent and civilization from civilization. There were, of course, migrations and conquests and colonizations, but these were sporadic, and normally the inhabitants of Peking or Buenos Aires could ignore the inhabitants of London and Paris as completely and safely as any inhabitants that there may be upon the planet Mars.

There was an element in the new Western civilization, issuing from the industrial revolution, which inevitably made it, outside Europe, predatory. Economically it required ever more markets and ever more raw materials; the more industrialization proceeded, the more necessary be-

came the opening up of new markets and new sources of raw material. The economic exploitation and penetration of Asia, Africa, Australia, and South America followed, and this was the first way in which the inhabitants of those countries felt the impact of the new civilization. In Asia and Africa this exploitation and penetration took a peculiar form which has made the imperialism of the nineteenth century a very different thing from the imperialisms, conquests, and clashes of civilizations in previous ages. The mechanical inventions in communication and transport put into the hands of Europeans the power of rapidly opening up distant and difficult countries for the purposes of industry and commerce. The same processes of invention and the new industry had also completely altered the balance of physical power in the world. Up to the nineteenth century the civilizations of the different continents materially were not so widely separated as to give to one an overwhelming preponderance over the other. An Asiatic army could always make a fight of it with a European army, and the African could

trust his poisoned arrows, his swamps and forests and mosquitoes, to protect him against the European with a muzzle-loading gun and a bottle of gin or brandy. But suddenly all this was altered. The Asiatic, living and fighting as his ancestors lived and fought in the twelfth century, found himself confronted with the modern rifle, the Maxim gun, the gunboat, and the light railway, while behind these, invisible and still unknown to him, was mobilized the colossal organized power of modern industry in a modern State. Asia and still more Africa were powerless to resist the will of Europe.

The words "the organized power of modern industry in a modern State" point to another important characteristic in the imperialism of the nineteenth century and in the changed relationship of Europe to the rest of the world. Behind the capitalist, the trader, the manufacturer, and the financier, who had emerged from the industrial revolution and who were now led by blind economic forces to stretch out their hands to the markets and produce of Asia and Africa, stood

the highly organized, efficient, powerfully armed, acutely nationalist modern State which had emerged from the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. Sometimes deliberately and sometimes haphazardly and unconsciously, the power of this terrific engine of force and government was invoked by the capitalist to aid him in developing or exploiting the other continents. The effect was stupendous. There was a sudden, rapid, and ruthless world-conquest on a scale such as previously was unknown in human history. Between 1815 and 1914 practically the whole of the continents of Asia, Africa, and Australia, with all the islands of the Seven Seas, was subjected, directly or indirectly, to the power of the European State. This process I shall consider in some detail in the following chapters; here I wish only to draw attention to its main characteristics. The subjection of Asiatic and African peoples to European States was sometimes direct, sometimes indirect. Direct subjection took place in Africa, which was partitioned among the Great Powers, Belgium, Portugal, Italy, and Spain, and in India,

Ceylon, Burma, the Malay Peninsula, parts of China, and considerable stretches of Asiatic territory absorbed by Russia. In all these cases the territory itself was annexed, usually by force, and incorporated within the European State in the form of an imperial appendage. The country was administered by Europeans; the Government was a European government and the inhabitants were subjected to European laws. But there was also, in the rest of Asia outside Japan, an indirect process of subjection. Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, Tibet, and China all remained nominally independent and sovereign States. But in fact their sovereignty no longer existed and their independence was illusory. All of them, in varying degrees, were brought under the tutelage of European States or groups of European States. Within limits they were allowed to manage their own affairs; but in economic and military matters and in their relations to Europe and Europeans they had to take their orders from Europe, in the knowledge that disobedience would entail extinction.

I repeat that in no other period of the world's history has there been such a vast revolution as this conquest of Asia and Africa by Europe in less than 100 years. Until very nearly the end of the nineteenth century, Europeans themselves regarded it with complacent pride as one of the chief blessings and glories of Western civilization. The white race of Europe, they held, was physically, mentally, and morally superior to all other races, and God, with infinite wisdom and goodness, had created it and developed it so that it might be ready, during the reign of Queen Victoria in England, to take over and manage the affairs of all other peoples on the earth and teach them to be, in so far as that was possible for natives and heathens, good Europeans and good Christians. Indeed, until the very end of the century the natives and heathens themselves seemed to acquiesce in this view of the designs of providence and the blessings of being ruled by Europeans. It is true that in almost every case originally a considerable number of Africans and Asiatics had to be killed before the survivors were prepared to accept the

dominion or, as it was often called, protection of a European State; but once the dominion was established there were few revolts against European rule which could not be met with a punitive expedition. The claims of Western imperialism were not seriously challenged until the savage Abyssinians successfully resisted the Italians in 1896 and Japan defeated Russia in 1905.

The Russian-Japanese War was a turning-point in the history of imperialism. Since 1905 it has become more and more evident that the conquest of the world by Europe is now being followed by a world revolt against Europe. The Japanese, at the end of their war with China in 1895, had been treated by the Great Powers of Europe as a non-European and therefore inferior State which, like Persia, China, or Timbuctoo, had to obey the commands of Western civilization. By refusing to obey the demands of a Great Power—Russia—in 1904, Japan struck a blow at this conception of world politics and against the whole imperialist system. The blow was successful, and Japan not only vindicated the right of a non-European peo-

ple to complete independence and sovereignty; she herself stepped into the ranks of the Great Imperialist Powers. The effect upon the non-European subject peoples all over the world has been tremendous. The effect was first felt in Asia; but, helped by the lessons and opportunities of the Great War, it has now spread to Africa and to South America. It gave hope and life to the widespread latent hostility to the dominance of European States, the exploitation of European capitalism, and the imposition of Western civilization. The movement, as I said, has become a world revolt against Europe.

If any one thinks that I am giving an exaggerated picture of imperialism and its position today, let him look round at the world in which we live today and compare it with the world of 1800 and of 1850. Between 1850 and 1927 the whole of Africa, with the precarious exception of Abyssinia and Liberia, was incorporated in the empires of European States, and in Asia the only people who retained the full status of sovereignty and independence was the Japanese. The Indians, the

Burmese, the Malays, large numbers of Chinese and Mongols had become subjects of European States, while the Turks, the Persians, the Afghans, and the Chinese, while nominally independent, had their external relations and a large part of their internal economic affairs controlled by European States. In 1900 active opposition to this system hardly existed. Today all the semi-independent States of Asia have broken loose from Western control, and Turkey, Persia, and China are in open revolt against European imperialism. Among the peoples who are the subjects of Western Powers the reaction has been equally violent. There is unrest, demand for self-government, and violence in India, and, despite reforms, the position of the British Government becomes more and more difficult; there are Nationalists, the *Wafd*, and an impasse in Egypt, where the gift of a fictitious independence does not satisfy the demand to be rid of Britain and Europe; there is an Arab national movement in Palestine. The French have unrest to deal with in Tunis, and Syria in flames against them in Asia. There is the epic and

tragedy of Abdul Karim's revolt against Spain and France in the Riff. Even in tropical Africa faint stirrings can be detected, and far away across the Atlantic the peoples of South America watch the nascent imperialism of the States with anxious and jealous eyes.

When we have all been dead for several hundred years, and when the events which we regard from the point of view of days, weeks, months, and years have shrunk and dwindled to incidents in what the historian sees as a "period" or a century, the historian of that time will probably consider this movement of nineteenth-century imperialism and the reaction against it as the most important facts in our era. It has already changed more violently and widely the conformation of human society over the earth's surface than any series of events since the great prehistoric migrations. The new Western civilization, if absorbed and adapted by the ancient civilizations of Asia or the more primitive inhabitants of Africa, might well turn the dreams of a Paradise into realities. Imperialism hitherto, by imposing it on subject

peoples at the point of the bayonet and the muzzle of the howitzer, has heavily overweighted the blessings with a load of war, barbarities, cruelties, tyrannies, and exploitations. The inevitable reaction has followed, and the subject peoples everywhere are attempting to throw off the domination of Western States and the tyranny and exploitation of Western civilization. The outcome of this movement of revolt will probably be of supreme importance in the history of the next hundred years. For it is a menacing movement, if only because the savagery and stupidity of man are as great as his humanity and ingenuity. Its future will depend largely upon the amount of folly and wisdom to be found in Europe and the United States. People sometimes still dispute whether imperialism is a good or a bad thing, whether Eastern peoples are or are not better off under European rule. Such questions are largely academic. Imperialism, as it was known in the nineteenth century, is no longer possible, and the only question is whether it will be buried peacefully or in blood and ruins.

In this book I am concerned with the nature and present position of imperialism and with this menacing problem which it has created, the problem of the future relations between Europe, with its Western civilization, and the rest of the world, particularly Asia and Africa. As I have already indicated, I regard it as part of the great problem, which has always perplexed humanity, of the rise of a new form of civilization, its adaptation to old institutions and its relations to other civilizations. This, I am aware, is not the way in which the facts present themselves to many observers and writers. What I regard as a clash of civilizations, they regard as a clash of races, religions, or nationalities. The difference in point of view is not unimportant, and I therefore propose to say a word or two about the relation of race, religion, and nationality to imperialism, though I may thereby be anticipating questions with which I shall have to deal again in subsequent chapters.

It is, of course, obvious that race, religion, and nationality are often intimately connected with the phenomena of imperialism. But in my view they

are rarely if ever the most important factors. Though racial and religious conflicts seem on the surface to be the vital factors, they really only disguise the much more fundamental problem of the clash of civilizations. They are not causes, but symptoms of a disease which is afflicting humanity in so many parts of the world. It is not race, religion, or nationalism, but the collision and maladjustment of different civilizations under the impulse of imperialism, which have caused the anti-foreign outbreaks in China, the unrest in India and Egypt, the renaissance of the Ottoman Turks, and the hostility of the Moslem world to Western Europe.

Take first the question of race. It is easy to represent the problem of the relation of China and Japan to the Great Powers of Europe and to the United States and the whole Pacific question as a racial conflict between white and yellow; or the question of the relations of African and European in Kenya or in South Africa as a racial conflict between black and white. Some people seem

to think that difference in the pigmentation of skin or the texture of hair is an adequate explanation of any political or social phenomenon. They are the people who explained the Great War by the colour of the German's hair and the shape of his head, and the fact—which happens to be quite untrue—that he is racially different from a Briton or a Frenchman. They are the people who before the Anglo-French entente of 1904 used to explain the hostility of France and England and the inevitability of war between the two countries as a racial conflict between the degenerate Latin and the manly Anglo-Saxon—ignoring the fact that there is no Latin race and no Anglo-Saxon race. In the complicated social and political problems which beset us in the modern world the easiest and most obvious explanations are always farthest from the truth. Nine-tenths of what is said and written about race and racial conflicts, about the inferiority and superiority of races, and about their inherent antipathies, is unmitigated nonsense, and any publicist who pretends to explain large

conflicts between States or within States by racial differences which are physical differences should be viewed with the greatest suspicion.

Let us briefly examine one or two of these great problems of so-called racial conflict. The Chinese and Japanese are racially different from the European, the Australian, and the citizen of the United States. The one is, let us say, a Mongolian with a yellow skin and the other a mongrel of many races with a white skin. China is in chaos and there is considerable and wide-spread antipathy there to the white man and his Governments. Japan is by no means in chaos; it is a modern State with an efficient army, a formidable fleet, and a strong Government. In Japan there is no violent antipathy to, though considerable suspicion of, the white man, and more particularly of the United States of America. The question of the balance of power in the Pacific, as between Japan and the United States, is a serious one and many people have held that a war between these two States will one day be inevitable. Finally the relations between yellow and white in the Far East and

Pacific are complicated by the objection which has arisen in Australia and America to the immigration of Japanese and, in some cases, Chinese and by the measures adopted to prevent or restrict it.

I do not deny that beliefs about race and the emotions connected with those beliefs enter into the dangerous hostilities in this situation. The Chinese mob shrieking "Down with the White Devils," the Shanghai merchant who thinks that the only way of dealing with the Chinese is what he calls "a strong hand" or what his forefathers called a whiff of grapeshot, the American who thinks Japan "a menace" to be dealt with by a very large navy and immigration laws—all these people are moved by racial beliefs and racial emotions. But to say that these differences of colour and race, and that the inherent hostility and incompatibility resulting from those differences, are the cause of these political situations and of the dangerous state of mind in which we see the Chinese mob, the Shanghai merchant, and the 100 per cent American patriot, would be an absurd misunderstanding of the facts; it would be as

useful a diagnosis as that of a doctor who said that the cause of scarlet fever was the spots on the patient's body. You have only to examine the history of events leading up to the various tensions between the Far Eastern peoples and the Western peoples to see that the racial conflict is only a symptom on the surface and that the real cause is the clash of civilizations under the impetus of imperialism and the reactions of the Far East against the imperialist West.

Consider, first, China itself. The area of China, including Mongolia and Tibet, is nearly 4 million square miles, its population about 320 million. The number of white persons who live in this gigantic and populous country is about 80,000. The bare statement of these facts shows that the present attitude of the Chinese to Europeans cannot be due to any racial conflict in any sense in which those words can have a definite meaning. There are not the elements of racial conflict in a situation in which 80,000 persons of one race are lost in a sea of 320 million belonging to another race. And what racial conflict is there between the

Chinese living in Peking and the English living in London or Manchester? Yet there is a conflict, and the Chinese of Peking and Nanking is violently incensed with the inhabitants of London and Rome and Paris whom he has never seen and of whose existence he has the vaguest conception. The conflict is not racial, it is a conflict of civilizations; the hostility is not racial, so much as a reaction against the imperialism of nineteenth-century Western civilization. The Chinese of China know the West only through the power of the Western imperialist States and through their traders. They know that those States have made war upon them to force them to open their ports to foreigners and to foreign trade and to buy foreign goods, including opium; they know that those States seized Chinese territory, that they have exacted indemnities, that they control Chinese Customs, and have exacted valuable economic concessions from Chinese governments. That is the form in which the industrialized, militarized, imperialist civilization of Europe has impinged during the last century upon the ancient, pacific,

artistic, intellectualized civilization of China. The reaction is a reaction against domination and exploitation of one civilization and one people over another. There is nothing racial in it except upon the surface.

Or take another aspect of the relations between the white and yellow races, the international friction between the United States and Japan. There are two sides to this friction. On the one hand, you have what is called the balance of power in the Pacific, a problem which the Washington Conference attempted to solve. There is nothing peculiarly racial about this question. It is a question of power, of armaments, of militarism and navalism and imperialism. The reaction of Japan against nineteenth-century imperialism was, as I have said, to turn herself into an efficient, industrialized, militarized State on the Western pattern. Her army and her navy immediately placed her in the ranks of the Great Powers, and she used her forces and prestige to pursue a policy of imperialism in Korea and China of precisely the same nature as that imperialist policy of the West to

protect herself against which she had built her own army and navy and had converted herself into a pretty good Asiatic imitation of a modern European State. Imperialism has always two faces; there is the relation of the imperialist Power to its subject peoples and that of the imperialist Powers to one another. The imperialist State seeks to rule and exploit, or control and exploit, subject peoples and their territory, and this almost always entails a struggle among the imperialist States themselves for the "places in the sun." The rivalry of Japan and the United States and the problem of the Pacific are only one among many examples of this struggle for power and place between the major States of the world. It is not specifically different from the rivalry between Russia and Britain in Asia or between France and Britain in Africa during the nineteenth century or between Germany and Britain in the twentieth. In each case you will observe the same symptoms: a desire to control distant peoples and territories for the sake of markets and raw materials, the emergence of questions of the balance of power

and the relative size of armies and navies, a direct competition in armaments, and then friction and hostility between the rival Powers over the whole field of international policy. The disease here is not racial; it is economic and political and springs from the general form and organization which Western civilization has developed and imposed upon the rest of the world. The situation may develop as easily between Germans and Britons or French and Italians as between people with a yellow skin and people with a white skin. All one can say is that once this imperialist rivalry and fear have come into existence, they may be complicated and exacerbated by racial differences and the delusions which so many people have regarding race.

The other side of the Japanese-American situation has to do with immigration. Here at last we reach an aspect of our subject in which race and racial conflict do play a part. The determination of the people of some parts of the United States not to allow the immigration of Asiatics, and particularly of Japanese, and the demand of the

Japanese that there shall be no special discrimination against them, create what both peoples regard as a racial question and conflict. The white people regard it as racial because, as they see the situation, their existence and predominance in their own country are threatened by the immigration of people of another race, with a different skin, a different civilization, and different standards. The Asiatic regards it as racial because he sees himself barred out of a country on the ground merely of race. But though race plays a large part emotionally in these immigration questions, it is necessary to observe that it plays only a minor part in causing the conflicts and problems. The hostility to Japanese immigration is primarily due not to the fact that the Japanese are of a different race from that of the inhabitants of California, but that their economic and cultural standards of life are different from those of the Californians. The immigration of large numbers of Asiatics would therefore be a menace to the economic position of those in possession and to the modes and standards of their civilization. The difference of race exacerbates the

hostility and becomes a good stick with which to beat up emotion, but the racial conflict only arises after the economic conflict and the clash of civilizations are already operative. I doubt whether the Americans or any other white people have ever shown hostility to Asiatic immigration unless and until that immigration has been of a kind or degree sufficient to cause an economic conflict and problem.

The conflict is, however, more truly racial if we look at it from the point of view of the immigrant nation, in this case the Japanese. As he sees it, the only reason for his exclusion is the colour of his skin—in his opinion, not unnaturally, an inadequate cause. For him therefore from the outset it is a racial question, and, whether he wishes in fact to go to California or not, the only thing which he sees clearly and persistently is the necessity for insisting that there shall be no discrimination against the yellow races in the Californian immigration laws.

I shall have often to return to this question of race in the following chapters; now I must pass

on to consider briefly the relation of religion and nationality to imperialism. Religion has, I believe, even less importance than race in the conflicts which have developed and are developing between the Great Powers of the West and the peoples of Asia and Africa whom they have attempted to control or rule. The revival of Muhammadanism and the fact that so many Islamic peoples have played a part in the recent revolt of Asia and Africa against Europe lend colour to the belief that many of these conflicts are religious. People even talk of a Pan-Islamic movement, which constitutes a menace to the "Christian" and Western peoples. Pan-Islam is one of those bogeys which haunt the dreams of good imperialists: it is of the same family as that other bogey, the "Yellow Peril," which haunted the dreams of that great imperialist, the Kaiser Wilhelm II. There is a certain poetic justice in the fact that it is the imperialists who are chiefly terrified by these international bogeys. For, as with most bogeys, there is a certain amount of reality and substance in the Yellow Perils and the Pan-Islamic scare. There

has been a notable revolt of Islam against the Christian States of the West, and a remarkable drawing together of Islamic peoples. But it is the revolt against imperialism, against the tyranny of Western civilization and the hegemony of European States, which has effected this. It has happened that both in Asia and Africa many of the nations and peoples who fell under the dominion of European States or were the victims of "economic penetration" during the last century, were Muhammadan. It is natural that when the tide turned against imperialism, the revolt followed that channel which was handiest to it. In the Far East it followed the channel of race; in Turkey, Egypt, Syria, the Riff, Arabia, and Persia it follows the channels worn by religious differences. But the religious conflict is only secondary and comparatively unimportant; it is a disguise of the deeper revolt against imperialism and of the conflict of civilizations.

Nationality and nationalism are of enormous importance in the world today and in the phenomena which I am examining. Yet this should

not blind us to the fact that they are, like race and religion, only a secondary cause of the tensions and conflicts in the international world. Consciousness of nationality and the virulent types of nationalism are new things in Asia and Africa, but the growth of both in recent years is very marked. The Turk, the Egyptian, the Persian, the Indian is now acutely national, if not nationalist. This nationalism enters deeply into all the struggles of these Asiatic and African peoples against the Western Powers. But it is not the cause of those struggles and conflicts. It is, once more, only a channel into which the waters of revolt against imperialism have run, naturally and unconsciously —a terrible and a dangerous channel, for it gives immense impetus and violence to the conflict. In other words, the reaction against Europe has almost invariably taken the form of nationalism. The dominance of European States in Africa and Asia, the forcible imposition of Western civilization upon Africans and Asiatics, and the economic exploitation accompanying imperialism have welded together the various "nationalities," made

them self-consciously nationalist, and taught them to use their new cohesion against their conquerors and rulers. It is the process which followed the French Revolutionary armies and the Napoleonic eagles in Italy and Spain, Holland and Germany, translated to and continued in the Atlas mountains, Cairo, Angora, Damascus, Mecca, Teheran, the mountains and the plains of India, and the vast territory of China.

In this chapter I have taken a broad survey of imperialism, and of the problem which faces us in what I have called the revolt of Asia and Africa against Europe. I have tried to show that the most important aspect of imperialism is the conflict of civilizations. In the following pages I shall consider in greater detail this conflict as it has developed in Asia and Africa. But before doing so, it is advisable to deal with its historical relations with previous similar conflicts. Accordingly in my next chapter I propose to say something about the history of civilizations and races before the nineteenth century and the age of imperialism.

II

CONFLICTS OF CIVILIZATIONS BEFORE THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

IMPERIALISM is in my view, as I have explained in my previous chapter, an aspect of the conflict or clash of different civilizations in the nineteenth century. The partition of Africa and the political and economic penetration of Asia and South America by European nations and the United States were parts of one of those historical movements or processes by which one civilization impinges or imposes itself upon others. The result was the conquest or political and economic subordination of Asiatic and African peoples by Western States.

That any one with any knowledge of the history of the past century should deny that there has been such a movement or process and that it

has been accompanied by the growth of specific attitudes of mind in the dominant or imperialist and in the subordinate or subject nations seems to me inexplicable. But it is necessary to insist upon this description and definition of imperialism, because there are many persons, particularly the most patriotic of imperialists, who deny that there is any such thing as imperialism. They assure us that it is a figment of the imagination of Little Englanders and other unpatriotic persons, a stick which they have invented for beating their own country. And whenever any one criticizes the policy of Western States towards the less efficiently developed countries of Asia or the "backward peoples" of Africa and incautiously uses the word imperialism, he is triumphantly dismissed as using a catchword the meaning of which no one understands.

Another line of attack upon the critics of imperialism is that they have given a new name to something which has always existed in the world, the process by which peoples of a superior race or civilization to some extent always dominate

and control those of inferior races or civilizations. It is the purpose of this chapter to meet both of these objections. I maintain that imperialism is a very real thing, a menacing movement which has developed a political psychology peculiar to itself and has already caused great political, economic, and social upheavals all over the world. I also maintain that this movement, although it displays some of the characteristics of conflicts of civilizations in ancient times, has some features peculiar to itself which make it one of the most dangerous developments in human history.

To understand imperialism from this point of view it is necessary to see it in its correct historical perspective. Its real nature can only be understood if the previous history of the relations between different civilizations, and in particular of Europe to the rest of the world, be understood. That is why I wish to devote this chapter to a survey of the history of races and civilizations before the nineteenth century.

Let me first restate as simply and impartially as I can the social or political problem of which

imperialism is an attempted solution. The French Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars, and the Industrial Revolution completely changed the fabric of society in western Europe. Sparce agricultural populations were converted into large industrial urban populations. These industrialized nations of the nineteenth century were far less capable of supporting themselves than the agricultural nations of the eighteenth century. They required and developed a highly organized and complicated system of foreign trade. It was the age of the machine and large scale industry, of modern finance, of the joint-stock company and capitalism, of the internationalization of industry, commerce, and finance. This was the economic side. On its political side, it was an age of transition from monarchy and aristocracy to what was called democracy. During this transition political power or influence, in most of the industrialized countries, passed into the hands of the new middle class and into the hands of the most wealthy and energetic members of that class, the financiers, manufacturers, and merchants, and the engine of

government was extremely sensitive to the wishes and ideals of this class. The characteristics of this civilization were immense energy in everything connected with industry and commerce, and the accumulation of public and private wealth; an intense preoccupation with material things; a rational and scientific attitude of mind; an ideal of material prosperity; a doctrine of liberty and equality.

It is only necessary to give this bald and inadequate summary of the characteristics of the new civilization to see that its effects and its operations could not possibly be confined to Europe. It was inevitable that it should stretch out to and eventually impinge upon the civilizations and peoples of Asia, Africa, and the rest of the world. The economic forces, combined with the new methods of transport, compelled it, as I have already said, to extend its economic relations in wider and wider circles. The new urban proletariats could, in many cases, only be fed if food were imported from foreign countries; the new inventions and processes created a demand for raw materials often

only produced in tropical lands; the enormous development of machinery and of cheap machine-made goods caused the whole world to be ransacked for mines and metals. These operations immediately resulted in an immense expansion of foreign trade. At the same time the other continents which were so important to the European manufacturer as his sources of raw materials also became more and more important to him as a market for the products of his industry, and, as under the impulse of protection he saw the markets of foreign countries in Europe closed against him, he became convinced that he must acquire new and more secure markets in Asia and Africa.

These economic impulses made it inevitable that the new commercialized, industrialized civilization of Europeans should come into close and violent contact with the peoples of Asia and Africa, and indeed the first contact was always economic. It was through traders or "planters" or Chartered Companies that Africa, India, Ceylon, China, Japan first became aware of Western civilization and, quickly on the heels of civilization,

of the power of the European State. For civilizations consist partly of material things, like stage coaches and aeroplanes, flint arrow-heads and machine-guns, and partly of beliefs and desires in the minds of living men. And I am inclined to believe that it is what goes on in men's heads which, contrary to current doctrine, chiefly determines their history and the fate of their civilizations. Certain things going on inside the heads of nineteenth-century Europeans made it inevitable that the penetration of Asia and Africa by the trader should be rapidly followed by the interference of the European State. Economic competition was a basic idea in nineteenth-century Europe. Tariffs and protective policies were weapons in this competition; and their growth was a perpetual menace in the minds of manufacturers and merchants. No sooner were the riches and the markets and the undeveloped resources of Asia and Africa opened up than they became the subject of "economic competition." It was a natural and logical step for the traders and capitalists of a country to call in the State to help them in this

competition. The European State, by acquiring or controlling these extra-European territories, would secure their markets and their raw materials for their European subjects. The flag followed trade and trade followed the flag.

There is one other idea which has influenced the history of imperialism, namely, that of nationalistic patriotism, which has been so marked a feature of nineteenth-century civilization. European nationalism became a religion, with the State as its object of worship. The idea of an empire became closely connected with the idea of patriotism in the minds of nationalists. An empire was bigger than a European State; it was a bigger State; and a bigger State is a greater god than a little State in the eyes of nationalism. The competition of traders for markets was therefore reinforced by the competition of patriots for national glory, and the acquisition of territory in Asia and Africa was on one side an economic security, on the other a patriotic duty.

Thus European civilization, with its ideas of economic competition, energy, practical efficiency,

exploitation, patriotism, power, and nationalism, descended upon Asia and Africa. But with it it also carried, involuntarily perhaps, another set of ideas which it had inherited from the French Revolution and the eighteenth-century forerunners of the French Revolution. These were the ideas of democracy, liberty, fraternity, equality, humanitarianism. They have had, as I hope to show, a profound effect upon the later history of imperialism, for they have led to the revolt of the subject peoples against it.

So far I have been examining the problem only from the point of view of Europe. But the position in Asia and Africa is also part of the problem. When the new civilization burst into such exuberant flower in Europe, Asiatics and Africans were living under conditions which were the results of their own histories. If you take, for instance, China, Japan, and India, you find that the people were living in highly organized communities, the products of very ancient civilizations, differing from that of Europe by being, on the whole, much more quiescent, religious, and

formal. They had developed their own elaborate forms of government and social classes, national traditions, standards of morality, philosophies of life, literatures, art, and architecture. If you turn to Africa, you find that it was inhabited mainly by more primitive peoples, who, however, had also gradually evolved often elaborate systems of society and government.

The problem which imperialism sought to solve was how to adjust the new civilization of Europe, with its imperious economic requirements, to the existing civilizations of Asia and the primitive lives of Africans. The solution of imperialism was to use the power of the European State directly in order to impose upon Asiatic and African the economic system and standards of Europe. The whole of Africa was partitioned, and there can be little doubt that Asia would have been treated in the same way if it had not been for the dangerous quarrels which arose among the European States themselves over the partitioning of the victims. As it was, territory and peoples were incorporated within the empires of European States, wherever

this could be done with safety; where it could not, complicated systems of masked political control and economic penetration were developed with substantially the same results. Thus the continents of Asia and Africa became politically subject to Europe, and, since the impulse towards this vast conquest was economic, the economic system of Europe was imposed by force upon the subject peoples without regard to their social organization, their traditions, or their interests. The difference between the political, economic, and social systems of the conquered and the conquerors was so great, and the conquest was so drastic and so sudden, that a violent conflict of civilizations was inevitable.

I have said that the problem which imperialism has sought but failed to solve was how to adjust the new civilization of Europe to the existing civilizations of Asia and the primitive societies of Africa. The word "adjust" is important, for it shows one respect in which this nineteenth-century clash of civilizations differed from those that have preceded it in history. Our Western civiliza-

tion is one of the most elaborate and complicated that has ever developed. It cannot exist at all without an intricate and delicate economic and political machinery. If you compare the highly organized machinery of central and municipal government, of industry, commerce, and finance in Europe today with the simple machinery of the eighteenth century—a century in which life was as complicated and civilized as it had ever been previously—you will see the enormous difference in this respect between our civilization and all those which preceded it. And this elaboration and complication of machinery and institutions are a vital part of that civilization. Sweep them away, and we should at once go back to the kind of life and the type of civilization of past centuries.

This fact has had a great effect upon the relations of Europe to the rest of the world since the industrial revolution. The primary impulse which brought the new civilization into contact with Asia and Africa was, as we have seen, economic. The manufacturers and traders who were the harbingers of imperialism in the hills and plains of

Asia and the forests of Africa went there with certain definite economic objects: they wanted to sell cotton or calico, to obtain tin or iron or rubber or tea or coffee. But to do this under the complicated economic system of Western civilization, it was necessary that the whole economic system of the Asiatic and African should be adjusted to and assimilated with that of Europe. That assimilation has been carried through by European manufacturers, merchants, and financiers, or by European governments under their influence and direction and, mainly, in their interests. In the process the lives of the subject peoples have been revolutionized and the bases of their own civilization often destroyed, and they have watched all this come upon them from outside, imposed upon them by force through an alien government.

Nothing like this and upon this scale has ever happened in the world before. Vast conquests and vast empires have been frequent in history, particularly in Asia, but the immemorial and respectable methods of empire and conquest were quite impossible in the nineteenth century, if only

because this assimilation with the economic system of Western civilization was necessary. Let us consider, from this point of view, some of the old examples of conquest, empire, and conflicting civilizations.

The impulse to conquest is important. The impulse to conquest of extra-European territory by European States during the nineteenth century was primarily economic and secondarily strategic. The first acquisitions of Indian territory, for instance, were due to economic motives; subsequent acquisitions were determined by the desire to protect the territory already acquired or to prevent acquisition by economic rivals. The whole partition of Africa, with rare exceptions, was governed by the same motives and policies. But the most ancient conquests and empires were hardly ever influenced by such considerations. Conquest was initiated either by the desire to acquire and actually occupy territory or by the romantic passion of warrior kings and peoples to rule. The effects were often violent but, from the point of view of civilization, transitory. The most violent

result of conquest was often the extermination of the conquered inhabitants and the occupation of their territory by the conquerors. The result was the substitution of one civilization for another, but the result was rarely important, for several reasons. Extermination on a large scale was seldom if ever possible, when killing had to be done literally by hand, and before modern inventions made it a part of wholesale business and large-scale industry. Moreover, in early times when civilizations were comparatively primitive, the difference between that of the exterminator and the exterminated was usually small, so that the effects of conquest by extermination were local and evanescent.

Thus in ancient times different civilizations could live side by side with only occasional and temporary clashes. There were conquerors and imperialists, but they had not the means or the machinery for holding together for any length of time large empires containing peoples of different civilizations. Civilizations influenced one another, but for the most part spasmodically or by infiltra-

tion, and conquests more often than not resulted in the conquerors being absorbed into the conquered and accepting their civilization.

The history of Greek civilization is most interesting from this point of view, for it is the antithesis of the history of Western civilization during the nineteenth century. The civilization of ancient Greece developed with great rapidity on its own lines and produced a type of society which has perhaps never been equalled and certainly never excelled. When at its zenith, Greek civilization had the Persian Empire on the east, the Egyptians in the south, the Latins and Phoenicians on the west, and the barbarians in the north. The Greeks were in contact with all these various civilizations and barbarisms, but there was no conflict between them which involved the destruction of one civilization by another or the permanent subordination of one to another. There was indeed a war between the Greeks and Persians which, the Greeks believed themselves, threatened the existence of their civilization, but I doubt whether this would have happened, even if the

Greeks had been defeated at Marathon. The Greeks left the Egyptians alone; they left the barbarians alone. It is true that they sent out colonies which spread Greek culture to the west, but there was no hegemony of Greek civilization in the Mediterranean as there is a hegemony of Western civilization in Asia and Africa today; nor was there any attempt to impose the economic and political systems of Greece upon other peoples. Later on came Alexander the Great, a typical imperialist of the ancient type, a mere conqueror, the founder of a vast heterogeneous empire which rose in a night and fell to pieces in a night.

Greek civilization was extraordinarily tolerant. It was not acquisitive or proselytizing or militaristic. Yet it had the greatest influence upon its neighbours and profoundly affected every civilization which followed it in Europe. The Greeks themselves were conquered by the Romans and incorporated in the Roman Empire, but Roman civilization was always dominated by Greek civilization. The Roman Empire and Roman imperialism are much nearer our own empires and

imperialisms than other movements of this kind in history. The Romans conquered and included in their Empire a vast extent of territory and a large number of different peoples and civilizations. To some extent they imposed upon all these peoples Roman civilization, with its political system, its roads, its legions, and its taxes. In some places, as in the South of France, which were near Italy, the inhabitants were almost completely Romanized. But elsewhere, and particularly in the distant provinces, the Romans did little more than maintain law and order, build their eternal roads, and exact a certain amount of tribute. In such provinces there was little direct contact with Rome, and the inhabitants were left alone, for the most part, to live their lives in their own way; that is, to follow the path of their own peculiar civilization or barbarism. Above all, there was no drastic revolution in the economic life of the subject peoples, and no economic exploitation of their territory and labour on a large scale. Hence, where there was a clash between Roman and provincial civilizations, the conflict was mild and the

penetration of one by the other spasmodic and gradual.

Let me give an example which will illustrate the enormous difference between Roman and modern imperialism. When the British came to Ceylon little more than a century ago, the hills and mountains in the centre of that island were wild places, the inhabitants Sinhalese living in scattered villages. The hills and mountains are now over large areas cleared of forest and jungle; the land is owned by English joint-stock companies and is planted with tea and rubber; the estates are controlled by Englishmen in the employ of these companies; the labour on the estates consists of Tamils imported from India, belonging to a different race and religion and speaking a different language from the Sinhalese. The area is administered by an English Civil Servant responsible to an English Governor, himself responsible to the Colonial Office and Parliament in London. The laws and ordinances of this administration, made and applied by Englishmen, regulate minutely the everyday lives of the inhabitants

not only in matters of public order, but also of the ownership of land, agriculture, trade, industry, labour, religion, and education. In other words, the whole life of this area has been completely revolutionized in the space of a hundred years. The impulse towards that revolution was originally economic—the growing of coffee, tea, and rubber by Europeans; the revolution has spread to every department of life and has resulted in what may be called, without exaggeration, a conflict of civilizations.

I have chosen this case of Ceylon because I happen to have observed it myself. But the story of the revolution in the mountains of Ceylon can be matched in many other parts of the British Empire. It is a common-place story of modern imperialism. But now compare it with what happened in a province like Britain in the Roman Empire. The Roman occupation of Britain consisted of a few roads, a few camps or settlements, a certain amount of trade. The Romans brought their civilization to Britain, but they did not impose it upon the inhabitants. There was no revolution in the

economic system, or in the tenure of land, or in the way of life of the inhabitants. There was Pax Romana, more peace and rather more security. And so when for the last time the legions fell in and marched back to Rome, and grass grew on the Roman roads and the Roman wall in the north began to crumble, it was as if Roman civilization had never crossed the Channel.

The Roman Empire was a very interesting experiment in human government which succeeded for some time, but eventually failed partly because there was no system for obtaining a stable government at the centre. It was a real attempt to organize a large part of the world peacefully and to include in a single social and political system a vast number of peoples at varying levels of civilization and barbarism. The Roman differed from the modern imperialist by his extraordinary tolerance, and it was this tolerance which kept the Empire together so long. He was tolerant both to the nationalism and civilization of other peoples, provided only that they consented to live peacefully within his Empire. He did not Roman-

ize, he did not impose his own civilization upon them; perhaps that was the reason why so many of them were Romanized and why Europe has been so profoundly influenced by Roman civilization.

The Renaissance is another period of history which throws light upon the problem of the clash of civilizations. The Renaissance, by the traffics and discoveries of its great explorers in Asia and by the discovery of America, brought Europe suddenly into relation with alien civilizations of Asia and America. The situation was almost precisely similar to that created in the nineteenth century, and it is very interesting to compare the solution of the sixteenth century with the solution of modern imperialism.

The Renaissance dealt with Asia in one way and with America in another. The European of the sixteenth century sailed his ships to Asia for the same reasons as the European of the nineteenth century. Both of them went there for markets and raw materials, and the impulse which brought the civilizations into contact was economic. But

there the resemblance ends. There was no conquest of Asia by Europe in the sixteenth century, no political or economic penetration or exploitation. The contact between the civilizations remained purely economic, the exchange of economic commodities. There was no racial conflict. This is very different from the history of the contact of Europe and Asia in the nineteenth century, and it is significant that this difference should exist, because, as I shall presently show, there are remarkable resemblances between the history of the relations of Europe and America in the sixteenth century and Europe and Africa in the nineteenth.

Why was there no conquest of Asia by Europe in the sixteenth century and no conflict, while Europe imposed its will on Asia in the nineteenth century, on America in the sixteenth, and on Africa in the nineteenth? The explanation is to be found, I think, in the facts to which I drew attention in my first chapter regarding power. As regards power and material force the civilizations of Asia and Africa at the time of the Renaissance

were more or less upon an equality. No European State had the power to impose its will upon India or China. There was therefore no attempt to dominate or control or to force one civilization to adjust itself to the political or economic system of another. The adjustment of one civilization to the other was on a basis of tolerance—religious, racial, political, economic tolerance. The contact between the continents and the peoples remained mainly economic. But in the nineteenth century Europe found itself with the power to impose its will on Asia; under the impulse of imperialism it proceeded to exercise that power, and in consequence the history of the contact of European and Asiatic civilizations has followed the path of struggle and conflict rather than that of tolerance.

There are features in the discovery and conquest of America which remind one of the imperialist partition of Africa several hundred years later. Europeans found in America native populations in a more primitive stage of civilization than themselves, and quite unable to resist them by force. There followed a ruthless conquest of

South America, the impulse to which was mainly economic. The Spanish or Portuguese conqueror was out for gold and other riches, but, having the power, he slaughtered the inhabitants by the way and incorporated the territory in a Spanish or Portugese Empire. The process was in part a conquest of the primitive type involving massacre and glory and dominion, partly an economic exploitation of the kind to which the economic imperialism of the nineteenth century has accustomed us. Both were carried out with a thoroughness and brutality which can be matched occasionally in Africa in the nineteenth century, but which nineteenth-century humanitarianism would not tolerate openly.

But though the economic motive was predominant in the original conquest of South America, and though there was an immense difference between the civilization of the conquerors and conquered, the process was without some of the most peculiar and dangerous features of the imperialist partition of Africa. The invading Europeans mixed and married freely with the native inhab-

itants, and the result was the gradual emergence of new South American nations, of two racial stocks, with their own South American civilization. Hence there was no conflict of civilizations and no racial conflict prolonged beyond the moment of the actual conquest. In consequence, the economic exploitation of the colonies by the mother countries, so characteristic of imperialism, became more and more impossible and the political ties less and less strong until, finally, almost without a struggle, the South American nations claimed and won recognition as independent sovereign States. But there is no sign that any solution of this kind is possible in Africa in those places where imperialism has governed policy. In the greater part of Africa white colonization is not possible, and there is practically no intermarriage between the blacks and whites. The two races remain distinct—the dominant whites a few thousand in number, the subject blacks numbering millions. There is therefore no fusion from which either new nations or a new civilization can spring. The white has forced the black into his own system and

scheme of things, and there he keeps him perforce. That is a marked characteristic of modern imperialism in Africa, and it carries with it the incessant tendency towards the economic exploitation of the subject black by the dominant white.

A word must be said about the history of North America. It has been entirely different from that of South America and from that of those territories subjected to the imperialism of the nineteenth century. North America was conquered and colonized. Its native inhabitants were exterminated or submerged. It has had its own problems, but not those of a conflict of civilizations and of imperialism. The Europeans who went to North America carried Western civilization with them and, as they increased and multiplied, they developed their own type of European civilization. North America, from the point of view of civilization, has always been, since its discovery, a part of Europe.

By carrying down this brief survey to the sixteenth century, I have already placed imperialism in its right historical perspective. For there was

no fundamental change in the relations of Europe to the rest of the world between the sixteenth century and the industrial revolution. The process of assimilation and national development which had begun in South America continued; the process of colonization and national development in North America. Africa remained an unknown and unexplored continent until the nineteenth century. The continent of Asia, except in India, and there only late in the eighteenth century, was left undisturbed to work out its own destiny and evolve its own forms of civilization. Not even the most far-sighted of prophets could have foreseen in 1750—no, nor in 1800 nor in 1830—the extraordinary transformation in the relations of Europe to the rest of the world which, under the impulse of imperialism, was to be completed before the end of the nineteenth century.

III

IMPERIALISM IN ASIA

The cause of imperialism was, as I have explained, the development of a new form of civilization in western Europe. The primary impulse which brought this new civilization into close contact with non-European peoples was economic. The newly industrialized nations of Europe, with the new means of communication and transport at their disposal, wanted to "open up," as it came to be called, the undeveloped countries of the other continents. There were, however, peculiar difficulties in the way of opening up Asia. The greater part of Asia is not inhabited by primitive peoples in the sense that the Africans, the Maoris, and the American Indians were primitive. In India, Persia, China, and Japan were very ancient civilizations which had produced their own elaborate social, political, and economic systems. The

spirit of these Asiatic civilizations was in most cases opposed to the industrialized, commercialized, energetic, democratic civilization of Europe. If the European trader regarded the Chinese as belonging to an inferior and moribund civilization, the Chinese regarded the European as a barbarian. He wanted to live his own life as his fathers had lived it before him; he wanted to buy and sell in his own peculiar way; he was not interested in machinery or rifles or railways or steamboats; he did not understand the mysteries of modern finance; he was disgusted and enraged by the doctrines of the Christian religion and sometimes it seemed to him as much a duty as a pleasure to kill missionaries. Finally, it must be noted that the chief countries of Asia are extremely thickly populated and that Asiatic peoples have an astonishing power of passive resistance.

It is no easy task to force upon such proud and civilized peoples, already for the most part organized in national States, a completely new economic system and the institutions and standards of an alien civilization. The methods by which the

European atempted to do this in Asia are the subject of my present chapter. I cannot attempt to cover the whole of the ground or deal with each nation or people of Asia separately. But it is necessary to treat the case of India by itself, for owing to various reasons the history of European imperialism in India has been different from its history in the rest of Asia.

The reason why it is necessary to consider India (and with India Ceylon) separately is because alone of Asiatic peoples the Indians had been for long in close contact with Europeans, and to some extent under the dominion of Europeans before the development of nineteenth-century imperialism. The trade with India had for centuries been of great importance, and all through the eighteenth century there had been keen rivalry among the commercial nations of Europe to obtain for themselves a monopoly of Indian trade and Indian riches. France, Holland, Great Britain, and Portugal were the principals in this struggle, and they all obtained, at one time or another, a foothold in India and Ceylon. It is, however, im-

portant to notice that up to the middle of the eighteenth century the relations of European traders and their governments with Indian rulers were in no sense imperialist. Asiatic territory and Asiatic governments were treated in the same way as European territory and governments. Great Britain or France made treaties with Indian rulers as they did with European kings and emperors, and the East India Company and other traders conducted their operations according to concessions from Indian governments and the laws and customs of India. The footholds obtained in India were not obtained by a struggle against the Indian rulers and the European did not impose his will, his political system, or his economic methods on India; the struggle was between the European rivals, each trying to prevent the other obtaining concessions or carrying on trade. This is a significant fact, for those who maintain that the conflict which is now taking place in India and the rest of Asia against Europeans is primarily a racial conflict must explain why it is that for two or more centuries before the birth of modern Western

civilization and imperialist policy in Asia there was continual contact between Europeans and Indian governments and peoples, and no appearance of racial conflict.

But the struggle between the Europeans themselves for the monopoly of Indian trade, as the eighteenth century went on and the first effects of the industrial revolution began to be felt, had important effects upon the relations of the Europeans to the Indians. During the European wars of the last half of the eighteenth century France, Great Britain, Holland, and Portugal were perpetually fighting one another in Asia, and it was natural that the East India Company, for instance, should develop from a trading corporation into a semi-militarized machine directed against the enemies of Great Britain and often acting in co-operation with the regular military and naval forces. It was only a small step from this to the application of force by the Company against Indians, to the acquisition of territory and virtual sovereignty in India, in fact to the beginning of the conquest of India. That is what began to happen under

Clive and Warren Hastings. The end of the Napoleonic Wars left Great Britain without a European rival of any strength in India and the solid foundations of an Indian Empire. In Great Britain itself the full effects of the industrial revolution were already being felt and the new industrialized civilization had been established. Modern imperialism was just about to burst upon Asia and Africa, and already there was blowing the wind which presages the storm. Under the influence of that wind and according to the rule that one conquest leads to another, the hold of Britain upon India was steadily extended during the first half of the nineteenth century.

Thus it came about that, when the real penetration of Asia by Europe under the impulse of imperialism began about the middle of the century, India was the only Asiatic territory which was not independent. It was securely held by Britain as part of her Empire. That is why the history of India during the era of imperialism has been different from that of the rest of Asia. That history is extremely interesting to the student of

imperialism, for it shows both the merits and demerits of imperialism at its best and also its final impossibility. The Government of India was an alien European government, administered by Englishmen, superimposed upon an Eastern people. It was organized on essentially European lines. According to its lights, it was an extremely efficient government, but its standards were the standards of Western, not Indian, civilization. Its efforts were mainly directed to material prosperity, and with that as an ideal it accomplished much. It built roads, bridges, irrigation works, railways, and it kept the peace between the various races and religions in India. It introduced English law and English conceptions of justice, and English methods of education. It did everything to forward the economic exploitation of Indian territory, particularly where such exploitation could be of advantage to British industry and trade.

In shaping this system of government and in directing its policy the Indian had no part. The ruling class was British, and as years went by, it became more and more firmly established as a

ruling class. Though it was extremely jealous of its own prestige and interests, there is no doubt that it also normally governed in the interests of the people of India. But inevitably the interests of India were sometimes not the interests of Britain, and where the interests were economic, those of India were sometimes sacrificed to those of Britain. A well-known instance is the excise on Indian cotton which was imposed solely in the interests of Lancashire. The large army maintained in India was and is a serious burden on the country; and to a great extent it serves the purposes of Britain and her Empire rather than those of India and the peoples of India.

The Government of India, this typically European government, as early as 1835 took a step which inevitably determined the history of its future relations to the people of India. It adopted a policy by which the State favoured the education of Indians on European lines. The effect of this policy was twofold. In the first place it meant that the Government was helping to create a large class of English-speaking and westernized Indians

who could not make use of their abilities and their training unless the society in which they lived was organized on European lines and unless there was a demand for their labour in the professions, the administration, and in commerce and industry. These conditions were not fulfilled. The Government itself debarred Indians, however able and educated, from all the higher administrative posts, while the professional and economic organization of India was such that there was no demand or scope for large numbers of the new, English-speaking class. Western civilization was therefore being introduced into and imposed upon India through education while the material conditions were not provided which might have prevented a conflict of civilizations. But the second effect of European education, being intellectual, was even more disturbing. That education spread through India those Western ideas of democracy and nationality, of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, of which imperialism and the Government of India itself were the negation.

Such was the imperialist system of government

in India. Its history between 1835 and 1927 is a signal proof that imperialism, if it be successful in imposing Western rule and Western civilization upon Asiatic civilization, must introduce a violent ferment of reaction and carries the seeds of its own destruction. Its history falls into three periods. There is the period which ended with the Mutiny, an ominous outbreak, part military, part religious, against alien rule. The second period begins in 1858 with the Queen's proclamation promising liberty and equality and ends in 1905. It was a period which saw the whole economic system of India transformed under the influence of the Administration and the entry of British capital. It saw the formation of an educated, English-speaking class at first mainly contented with British rule, but growing gradually more and more restive as it found itself denied the liberty and equality which had been promised to Indians. It saw the beginnings of a political movement for obtaining self-government in the Indian National Congress which started in 1885, and later the beginnings of a nationalist move-

ment. It saw the development of the British Civil Service into a very efficient and loyal administration, but also into a ruling class with its own interests and prejudices. The third period began in 1905 and still continues. It is a period of complete revolt against Europe. Influenced by the example of Japan, there is a rapid and violent development of Indian nationalism. The political principles of Europe are invoked against Europe, and practically all English-speaking Indians demand self-government. A new and curious feature appears in this movement, a feature which we shall continually meet in other conflicts between Asiatic civilizations and the imperialist civilization of western Europe. The educated Indians in their struggle against the Government use all the weapons of political organization and agitation which have been developed and perfected in Europe; they have learnt the lesson of efficiency and organization from Western civilization, and on what may perhaps be called the material side of things they are westernized. But this material westernization has been accompanied by a violent reaction

against the spiritual side of Western civilization and a characteristic revival of Indian nationalism. In the doctrines and influence of Gandhi one sees most clearly the renaissance of the ancient Asiatic civilization in its conflict with the imperialist civilization of Europe.

The educated classes in India have during this third period succeeded in enlisting to a considerable extent the uneducated, agricultural classes in their revolt against British domination and in their demand for Home Rule. Political unrest has indeed reached such dimensions that the Government of India has been seriously embarrassed. It has become more and more clear that a continuation of the imperialist system of government in India, in face of the active or passive hostility of all the educated classes, is impossible and that sooner or later the demand for self-government will have to be granted. The Morley-Minto and Montagu-Chelmsford reforms are the acknowledgement of the ultimate impossibility of imperialism in India.

I must now turn from the history of Great

Britain in India to that of the relations of European States to the other countries of Asia which retained a nominal independence. The history of China, Japan, Persia, and the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century is in each case dominated by imperialism, and in each case the same succession of phases can be observed. I cannot treat the history of each of these countries separately in detail, and I therefore propose merely to consider this succession of imperialist phases throughout Asia.

The first phase is economic penetration, which almost inevitably leads to the second phase, economic penetration accompanied by political control. I have said more than once that the first contact which Asia had with the new European civilization of the nineteenth century was economic. In its simplest form it was the kind of economic contact which had existed for centuries on a restricted scale between the two continents. It consisted in the exchange of commodities. But the industrialization of western Europe and the new methods of transport enormously increased the scale of this

inter-continental trade and immediately led in certain cases to conflict. The way in which China and Japan, for instance, began their acquaintance with modern Europe is typical and has influenced the whole subsequent history of the Far East. Both the Japanese and the Chinese, but particularly the former, objected to and prohibited the entrance of foreigners and foreign traders into their territories. For centuries this state of things had existed without causing friction between the Far East and Europe, but towards the middle of the nineteenth century the belligerent, exploiting, and crusading forces in the new European civilization began to work. In 1839 they caused the first Opium War between China and Britain which ended with the Treaty of Nanking of 1842. Under that treaty China was compelled to cede the island of Hongkong to Britain, to open certain "Treaty Ports" to foreign trade, to allow foreign traders to reside in those ports, to grant certain privileges to foreign residents. The same process was repeated in Japan some years later. In the forties American ships sailing to the new Treaty

Ports of China found that the Japanese refused to allow them to enter Japanese parts. "The shipping, especially the whaling, interests in the United States asked the administration to insist that the country unlock its doors. Finally the American Government responded and sent a squadron under Commodore Perry to obtain a treaty." [1] Under the threat of force a treaty was obtained in 1853 and a further treaty in 1858. Ports were opened and rights of residence and commerce for foreigners obtained. There was, however, still resistance from the Japanese and in 1863 an attempt to expel foreigners. It was only after a British naval force had bombarded Kagoshima and destroyed the forts at Shimonoseki that Japan was really opened to European traders.

There were, however, other and subtler ways in which the economic penetration of the indipendent States of Asia by Europe began to accomplish itself. There was, for instance, the entrance of foreign, European capital either for exploiting the natural resources of Asiatic territories or for

[1] K. S. Latourette, *The Development of Japan*, p. 108.

building railways. From the middle of the nineteenth century there was keen rivalry among the financiers and capitalists of western Europe and North America to obtain mining, railway, and other concessions in the Ottoman Empire, Persia, and China. The first railway concession in Turkey was given to an English company in 1856 and the line was opened in 1866. In 1884 France obtained a treaty with China which gave to France a sphere of influence, as it came to be called, for railway construction.

It is this capitalist penetration of non-European countries which is most characteristic of nineteenth-century imperialism and which led, necessarily and almost immediately, to the second phase of imperialism, namely, economic penetration accompanied by political control. The form of political control varies in different cases and places, but it always makes its appearance, because the organized power of the European State is sooner or later invoked either to induce the Asiatic State to give concessions to its capitalists or to protect them from the encroachment or competition of

other capitalists. Some of the forms which this combined economic and political penetration took can best be explained by a rapid survey of the history of the second phase in China, Persia, and Turkey.

During the last half of the nineteenth century the break-up of China and its partition among the Great Powers of Europe were continually threatened, but were never actually consummated. From 1885, when France took Tonquin and Annam and Britain took Burma, down to 1897, when there was a scramble among all the Great Powers for Chinese territory, the carving up of the victim was several times begun. The feast was, however, always interrupted and the feasters desisted, for the simple reason that they feared that the party which had begun with their dining off China would end with their dining off one another. It was only the rivalry, distrust, and fear among the imperialist Powers which saved China from dismemberment and incorporation in the empires of European States. And if those States did not actually partition China, they did the next best

thing to partition, they divided her into what were called "spheres of interest." The nature of these spheres of interest shows that it was desire for economic penetration and exploitation which led to the interference of the European State and to political control. When China was compelled to acknowledge a sphere of interest belonging to a European State, she acknowledged that "the Power, or its nationals, claiming the sphere, should have preferential, or in some matters practically exclusive rights, with regard to the making of loans, the constructing of railways, the opening and operating of mines, and the carrying out of public enterprises, such as conservancy works, etc."[1] Thus a sphere of interest was merely a sphere of economic penetration and exploitation.

The economic exploitation of China by Europe and America was by the end of the century ruthlessly accomplished, without any consideration for the wishes or interests of the Chinese. Railway concessions were extorted by ultimatums; the customs were under European control; the tariffs

[1] Willoughby, *Foreign Rights and Interests in China*, p. 134.

were fixed by European States in their own interests; taxes were earmarked to pay the interest on loans made by European capitalists; foreigners were not subject to Chinese law or Chinese courts. One significant fact will show the extent of the subjection of China to the imperialist Powers. There is an authoritative book by Professor Willoughby entitled *Foreign Rights and Interests in China;* so numerous and complicated are those rights that the book runs to two volumes and nearly 1200 pages. The rights and interests are almost all economic. But if Professor Willoughby had tried to write a similar book entitled *Foreign Rights and Interests in Britain,* or *in the United States,* he would not have found material sufficient to fill a single page.

In other words, then, the imperialist Powers of Europe, the United States, and subsequently Japan controlled the economic life of China. The control was obtained in every case under the threat of force; it was exercised primarily in the interests of the commercial, industrial, and financial classes of the controlling Power. The same proc-

ess took place in Persia and in Turkey. In Persia only two of the great imperialist Powers were concerned. The country lay between the Russian Empire and the Indian Empire, and for long there was a struggle between Russia and Britain for economic exploitation and political control. This rivalry undoubtedly saved Persia from annexation or absorption. In 1907 an attempt was made to end the rivalry on the lines adopted in China. The Anglo-Russian Agreement divided Persia into two commercial zones, the northern and central being reserved for Russian exploitation, the southern for British. The episode of Mr. Shuster in 1911 shows the working of this kind of imperialism. Mr. Shuster was an American appointed by the Persian Government to reform the finances of Persia. But a financially sound Persia was not what Russia wanted and she determined to oust Shuster. Seizing the first opportunity she issued an ultimatum demanding the dismissal of Shuster and the American had to be dismissed. In 1911 it looked as if Persia was a decayed and

moribund State completely in the hands of Britain and Russia.

Turkey, too, as every one knows, was thought to be a sick and dying State all through the last part of the nineteenth century. Imperialism dealt with her as it did with China and Persia, though in her case there were historic and strategic complications. But we find the same desire for and talk of partition among the Great Powers, the same hesitation to begin the cutting up because no one could agree upon the division of the spoils. There is the same lopping away of territory on the extremities nominally subject to Turkey, Algeria, Tunis, Egypt, and Tripoli. There is the same control of the finances and the same extra-territorial rights for Europeans, the same struggle for concessions and spheres of interest for railway construction in Asia Minor. As Professor Earle has put it, by 1899, when the concession for the Bagdad railway had been granted, the Sultan had mortgaged his empire, and I would add that the mortgage had been given to imperialism.

I have so far been describing and analysing the first and second phases of the imperialist penetration of Asia. The second phase ended with the end of the nineteenth century. In 1900 it seemed almost impossible that Asia would ever break away from the economic and political domination of Europe. Most people would have said that the process of absorption of Asiatic territory in the empires of European States would inevitably continue until the partition of Asia was as complete as that of Africa. In the third phase, which has already lasted about twenty-five years, a complete reversal of previous history has taken place. It has been marked by a revolt against Europe which has stirred Asia from Angora to Peking. And the revolt has so far been successful. Let us consider for a moment the present situation in Asia.

There are three centres to the Asiatic revolt against Europe: the Far East, India, and the Turkish Empire. In the Far East, Japan has asserted her right to independence and to equality with the great Western Powers. China has lost some territory to imperialist Powers and internally

is in a state of chaos, but she is in active rebellion against, and has to a large extent shaken off, the economic and political control of Europe. In the Far East the struggle against imperialism has roused intensely nationalist feelings in both Japanese and Chinese and has, as I showed in my first chapter, developed along racial lines. The second focus of revolt is India, where its form is national rather than racial, political rather than economic. The Indians demand Home Rule, at the least, the right to political control of their own affairs, but the revolt against the British Government is complicated by a very violent and bitter religious conflict between Indians themselves. The Asiatic revolt, it may be noted, has spread in the Indian centre to Afghanistan, and what happened there is typical of what has happened in so many places in Asia during the last ten years. The emir, Amanullah Khan, determined to westernize his country in order to be able to withstand the dictatorship of Western civilization. His first reforms were naturally directed to increase his military strength; and in 1919 he tried to test that strength

by declaring war on Britain. He was defeated, but in the peace negotiations he won recognition of independence for his country. The third centre of revolt is Turkey, and here the resistance to Europe has followed the channel of religion. The renaissance of Turkey and her successful assertion of complete independence have been accompanied by or accomplished through a curious combination of apparently contradictory measures. There has been a great Moslem revival and a movement towards Pan-Islamism; there has been a wide and conscious reaction against Europe and Western civilization. And yet at the same time the Turkish nationalists, like the Afghan emir, have deliberately westernized the organization and framework of government and society. They have used Western civilization in order to be strong enough to throw off the economic and political domination of Western civilization. This movement of nationalism combined with westernization, which is so widespread today in Asia, is, I believe, one of the most significant of the new features in the revolt against Europe. In Turkey and the Near

East, at any rate, it has so far been very successful, for practically all the peoples of the Near East and Persia, including the Arabs, have, except in mandated territory, won their independence.

Such is the present position in Asia, very briefly outlined; it is the result of half a century of imperialism and a quarter of a century of revolt against imperialism. The international problem presented by it is one of the most difficult and dangerous which has ever confronted human beings. It is impossible to believe that this widespread and deep-seated revolt against Europe and the movement towards independence will not continue. Yet it is not easy to see how the complicated situation which the imperialism of the Great Powers has left in Asia can be disentangled without further disasters. The racial complications in the Far East and the religious complications in the Near East are by themselves not difficult of solution. In Asia itself there are no grounds at all for a racial conflict between yellow and white. The contact of the white man with the yellow in the Far East is not racial, but economic and political,

and if his economic and political relations were once satisfactorily stabilized there would be no racial conflict. In the same way, there is no real ground for a religious conflict in the Near East, for a conflict between a revived Muhammadanism and Christianity. The days when these two religions were active and crusading forces in the world have passed; and here again, if the economic and political relations between Asia and Europe were placed on a satisfactory basis, there would be no religious conflict.

But the problem of adapting Asiatic societies to the new Western civilization and of the passage from subjection to independence remains. From this point of view, the legacy of imperialism to Asia is two great dangers. The case against the nineteenth-century imperialist rests mainly on the short-sighted and crude selfishness with which he pursued his ends outside Europe. Trade, profits, railways, metals, markets—these were the limits of his political horizon and the ends of his policy. In blindly pursuing his own economic interests, he used his now overwhelming power to compel

the Asiatic to accept just so much of the European's civilization as would serve the European's interest. The internal condition of a country like China or Persia, or even India, today is a result of this crude imperialism. In all three countries the ancient Asiatic civilization has to a considerable extent been destroyed and the methods and standards of Western civilization, particularly in things material or military, imposed forcibly from above. These methods and standards are not fully understood by the vast mass of the people, and there is thus a latent conflict of the two civilizations in the country as a whole, and even in the mind of the most ignorant peasant. The imperialist, seeing this, proclaims triumphantly that these people are not capable of managing their own affairs; and in one sense this is true. They are in a transition period in which they have not made European civilization their own or adapted their own civilization to it. In countries like China and Persia the transition is made all the more difficult by the economic chaos for which imperialism itself is largely responsible. But unless that transition is

effected, there can be no peace or stability or progress in Asia. Somehow or other the Chinese, the Persian, and the Indian will have to learn how to adapt his own civilization to Western civilization, how to manage his own affairs in his own way, while making use of the railway and the aeroplane and the vast and complicated system of industry, commerce, and finance which forms the framework of Western civilization.

Here then is one danger left to us by imperialism, namely that Asiatics themselves will not have the patience or wisdom or ability for making this transition. The other great danger is from the imperialist. If the transition is to be made, somehow or other the passage from subjection or control to complete independence must also be made throughout Asia. I believe myself that the revolt against Europe has already reached the stage at which it cannot be successfully resisted. But it may be resisted. The path to Home Rule in India is beset with difficulties, and the sort of chaos which exists in China will for years afford arguments for those who hold that Asiatics cannot govern

themselves and also opportunities for "intervention." It is possible that the movement towards independence might temporarily be resisted with success and the control of Europe reimposed, but in the end the revolt would only be the more violent and destructive. One of the most dangerous symptoms in Asia is the crude nationalism to which the reaction against imperialism has given birth. It was nationalism in its crudest forms which gave to Europe the miseries of the Great War. Unless Europe does its best to help Asia to pass from imperialist subjection to complete independence without resistance and friction, the world may find itself faced with a conflict and outburst of nationalism compared with which the Great War was the mildest of evils.

IV

ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM IN AFRICA

Africa is perhaps the place in which the nature and effects of imperialism can be studied with greatest advantage. Nowhere else can one see more clearly that imperialism is primarily an attempt to solve the problem of conflict between civilizations, and that the evil which it has caused and still causes is mainly due to the habit of European civilization of subordinating everything to economic ends. Imperialism and Western civilization have had their chance in Africa; they could do exactly what they liked there; there were no ancient civilizations offering obstruction and resistance both in the minds and the institutions of men. The African, physically and mentally, was absolutely unable to resist the European; and in Africa, therefore, the European had clear ground,

a virgin field, to show the world what the blessings of his civilization and the teachings of his religion—Christianity—could accomplish. In this chapter I propose to examine the record of European civilization and of Christianity in Africa.

Before doing so, it is necessary to explain what I mean by Africa. The history of that continent and of imperialism there has not been uniform from Tunis to Cape Town. The north of Africa has a different historical and racial record from the rest of the continent; it is inhabited by peoples who have been deeply influenced by Egyptian and Arabian, and to a less extent by Greek, Roman, and Mediterranean civilizations. They have all, from the Egyptians to the Moroccans, suffered during the nineteenth century the economic penetration and political and military domination of western Europe, but the impact of imperialism was much nearer the type which we have already studied in Asia than that which we shall find in the rest of Africa. For outside Egypt, Tripoli, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco, Africa is inhabited by what are now called primitive peoples—the

negro or black races—who, though they have evolved their own peculiar, and often elaborate, social systems, have nothing to correspond to the advanced and complicated and deeply-rooted civilizations and culture of Asia and Europe. Hence the new Western civilization and imperialism naturally dealt with these peoples in a different way from that in which they dealt with Asiatics. I shall therefore in this chapter confine myself to the study of negro Africa, and even from negro Africa I propose to exclude, for the most part, South Africa. The reason for this exclusion will appear later; it is due to the fact that the history of South Africa has introduced a complication which makes it more convenient to discuss South African imperialism in the next chapter.

It is not necessary to go in any detail into the actual history of the partition of Africa and of the history of imperialism there, partly because it is so much simpler than the history of the relations between Europe and Asia, and partly because so much has been written about it. It will, however, be convenient to state the main facts. The pene-

tration of Africa by Europe and her civilization began about the year 1880. The original impulse was entirely economic. You can see this from the fact that in almost every case the first steps towards partition and the incorporation of African territory in European States were taken by traders or capitalist companies working in co-operation with explorers or through their own agents. The usual procedure was for the explorer or agent to penetrate some distance inland from the coast and induce the chiefs or kings, by gifts of cloth or alcohol, to sign so-called treaties with the joint-stock companies. According to the treaties, these African rulers, whose signature consists of a mark, ceded the whole of their territory to joint-stock companies in exchange for a few yards of cloth or a few bottles of gin. Nearly all the Central African possessions of European States rest upon such titles. For in the bitter competition for economic and political control of Africa, which occupied the years 1880 to 1895, the Great and Little Powers of Europe made these treaties between African chiefs and their nationals the basis

of claims to imperial ownership. When Stanley, King Leopold's private agent, made such treaties in the name of King Leopold's famous Association in the Congo, Congolese territory passed to Belgium; when Dr. Peters induced an East African chief to make a mark on a piece of paper, his territory passed into the hands of the Gesellschaft für deutsche Kolonisation, and thence into those of the German Reich; and when the agent of the National African Company, Limited, induced an emir to do the same in Nigeria, the sovereignty over his territory mysteriously passed to Queen Victoria as head of the British Empire. This pleasant game was played so fast and furiously that very soon the official agents of the competing Powers, consuls and admirals, took a hand in it. Dangerous quarrels broke out between the competing agents and the competing Powers, and in order to avoid danger to themselves they established a curious rule of the game. It was solemnly established as a rule of international law that any European Power which had, by these means, acquired sovereignty or a claim to sovereignty over

any strip of African coast also acquired sovereignty or a claim to sovereignty over the hinterland; *i.e.* over all the territory behind the strip, presumably stretching right back until it met the hinterland of the strip on the opposite coast of Africa.

In less than twenty years the whole of Central Africa was partitioned and incorporated in the Empires of Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Portugal, and Italy. It is unnecessary to say anything more in detail about the methods of this imperial conquest and partition, but it is necessary to say one word about one aspect of it. The imperialist apologist will often now admit that during the partition many cruel and unscrupulous things were done in the name of European States in Africa, and even that the title to their African possessions will not bear too close a scrutiny. "But," he will continue, "all that is past and done with; we can't alter what happened forty years ago; it is the present and future of Africa which matter; and it's no good raking up unsavoury bits from the rubbish-heap of history." There is, of course, some truth in this apology, but only a half-

truth. The methods by which their territory was taken from Africans and the sovereignty of European States established were often savage; they were always incredibly mean and unscrupulous. These methods have had a great influence upon the subsequent and the present relations of the European and the African. They set the standard, they defined the attitude of European rule. They implied that in the view of Western civilization and of Christianity the black man was little better than an animal, whose land could be taken from him legitimately either by force or by fraud, and whose interests were naturally subordinate to those of a joint-stock company. This attitude of European imperialism still persists, often of course unconsciously, and has determined the history of the government of Africans by European States. Its effects and the alternative methods by which European civilization might deal with the African problem are the subjects which I wish to discuss in this chapter.

It is necessary first to understand the problem. It is quite different from that of the adjustment

of the new Western civilization to the ancient civilizations of Asia. The Africans in 1880 were primitive peoples, absolutely unable to withstand the European or to understand, far less assimilate, his civilization. They lived in primitive tribal societies, which in many places were cursed with the ancient heritage of the slave trade. Agricultural and pastoral peoples, they depended entirely for existence upon their land, which was owned and often occupied communally. The land was over vast areas, immensely rich in products of the greatest value to the new and expanding industries of Western Europe and America. The opening up of Africa, with its wealth of raw materials and the great market of its population, was therefore inevitable. I believe myself that, taking all the facts of the time into consideration, the immediate incorporation of African territory in European States, or at any rate the bringing of Africans under direct European rule, was desirable. It was desirable in the interests of the African, who in 1880 was completely helpless in the hands of a trader or an adventurer armed with a modern

rifle. The administration of African territory by regular European governments was therefore necessary to protect the inhabitants from merciless massacre and exploitation by private adventurers.

The problem therefore was threefold: to open up Africa for the economic purposes of Europe, to protect the native against immediate exploitation, and deliberately to educate him so that he might become able to understand and deal with the new situation imposed upon him by Western civilization. This is not a theoretical and historical judgment concocted in the study *ex post facto*. There is evidence that the problem was clearly recognized at the time, not by cranky and humanitarian theorists, but by the practical statesmen of Europe. In 1885 all the chief States of Europe and the United States of America sent representatives to the Conference of Berlin to discuss the problem of "the development of trade and civilization in Africa." As a result of that Conference the famous Berlin Act was signed "in the Name of Almighty God." In the preamble to this famous treaty the problem is stated with the greatest clear-

ness. The signatory Powers announce to the world that they wish "in a spirit of good and mutual accord, to regulate the conditions most favourable to the development of trade and civilization in certain regions of Africa; . . . to assure to all nations the advantages of free navigation; . . . to obviate the misunderstandings and disputes which might in future arise from new acts of occupation on the coast of Africa"; and that they are "concerned, at the same time, as to the means of furthering the moral and material well-being of the native populations." The actual provisions of the treaty also distinguish between the three parts of the problem, the development and encouragement of trade, the protection of the native, and finally his education in the ways of European civilization. Most of the articles deal with trade; but the first two paragraphs of Article VI. are as follows:

All the Powers exercising sovereign rights or influence in the aforesaid territories bind themselves to watch over the preservation of the native tribes, and to care for the improvement of the conditions of their moral and

material well-being, and to help in suppressing slavery, and especially the slave trade.

They shall, without distinction of creed or nation, protect and favour all religious, scientific, or charitable institutions and undertakings created and organized for the above ends, or which aim at instructing the natives and bringing home to them the blessings of civilization.

It will be seen that it would have been impossible to define more explicitly the problem which confronts a European government in dealing with primitive peoples than has been done in this solemn international agreement signed forty years ago by the kings and statesmen of Europe. They were well aware that, with the sudden opening up of the country to European commerce and with the sudden introduction of the competitive economic system and "the blessings of Western civilization," it would be necessary to protect the moral and material well-being of the African and educate him so that he could understand and make use of those blessings. They pledged themselves to do so in the Name of Almighty God. The history of the greater part of Africa, during the forty

years that have passed since the signing of that convention, is merely the story of how that pledge has been broken.

I do not propose to retell that history. Every one knows the story of the Congo and how the moral and material well-being of the natives was watched over there. Every one since the war has heard how the Germans treated their African subjects. Every one ought to have heard how the British Government has treated the natives of Kenya Colony. Every one ought to know that the Portuguese broke their pledge a little more ruthlessly and the French a little less ruthlessly. It would be a waste of time to retell the story of atrocities, exploitations, and hypocrisy which forms so large a part of the record of African imperialism. It is more useful to analyse the problem itself which still confronts us in Africa, for only by understanding it can it be solved.

In the first outburst of imperialism, there is no doubt, the problem was in one respect not understood. In those days the people who were most anxious to acquire African territory believed that

it could be colonized in the old sense of the word; *i.e.* that the Germans could make a German Australia of Tanganyika and the French a French Australia of Senegal. This belief was rapidly proved to be a delusion. It soon became obvious that Africa is not colonizable by Europeans; and today only South Africa and parts of Kenya are still claimed as white men's countries. (I may say here that as soon as there is an indigenous white population the problem immediately becomes complicated, and that is why I have excluded South Africa from this chapter. Kenya, on the other hand, has no indigenous white population and is not, in this sense, a white man's country.)

As soon as it became clear that Africa was not colonizable, the African problem was greatly simplified. The European was only interested in Africa in so far as it could be exploited economically. To open it up to his trade and to profit by its riches, he would certainly attempt to apply his own economic and industrial system to it. He would try to get possession or use of the land and the minerals; he would try to get the natives to

work for him on the land or in mines for the lowest wages which they could be induced or coerced to accept. In other words, the blessings of Western civilization due to the industrial revolution, which had taken about 100 years to be introduced into Europe and had in most cases required the mitigation of Factory Acts and industrial legislation to make them tolerable, would in the space of a year or two be imposed upon Africans living hitherto in a society which was nearer that of Cain and Abel than that of London and Paris.

Given such a situation, if the moral and material well-being of the natives really was to be protected, how could this be accomplished? Two things were absolutely essential to its accomplishment: to protect him where he was economically most vulnerable, *i.e.* in his land and his labour, and on the intellectual and spiritual side to educate him so that eventually he might understand the new conditions and be able to protect himself. I will consider the economic point first.

Peoples who live like the Africans in primitive agricultural and pastoral societies are absolutely

dependent on the land. Deprive them of their land or of access to the land and they are helpless; they either die out or become, in fact if not in name, the slaves of those who are in occupation of the land. Their wants are, however, extremely simple, and provided that each man has sufficient land to maintain himself and a few wives and families, nothing but force will make him leave his own land to work for wages elsewhere. Consequently any European government which found itself called upon to administer African territory, with European civilization, joint-stock companies, and Christianity knocking at the door in the eighties and nineties of last century, had to choose between two contradictory policies. It could, and usually did, let in Christianity through the missionaries. But if it let in the joint-stock company or the so-called settler by alienating the land to them or by giving them control over the natives' land and labour, it put the native absolutely into the hands of the European and his economic system. On the other hand, it could refuse to allow the alienation of the natives' land to Europeans or

their joint-stock companies (or even its exploitation), but in that case it laid itself open to the charge that it was closing the door against European civilization.

This economic and political dilemma faced every European government from the very first moment of the penetration and partition of Africa. Not only did it face them, but, as I shall show, they knew that it faced them. It faces them today and they know that it faces them. Nowhere in primitive communities can you let in the European settler and the European company promotor and allow them to acquire the land without sooner or later making the native the economic slave of the white man. The reason is obvious: in the first place, the African is a child in the hands of any European, scrupulous or unscrupulous, where it is a question of the working of the European's economic system, and in the second place, the African community depends absolutely for its existence upon free access to abundant land. And the corollary of this is one which, perhaps, the opponents of economic imperialism have not been

always prepared to face fairly and squarely. The corollary is that if the African is assured of sufficient land for the support of himself and his family and if there is no forced labour, it is practically impossible to introduce the European wage system into Africa. There is therefore a fundamental difference of opinion with regard to African policy between those who maintain that the land can only be developed by European exploitation and those who maintain that, whatever be the truth about this dogma, the interests of the natives are the primary concern of a European government in Africa.

It would require a large book adequately to deal with this controversy; all that I can do here is to summarize my own opinion on the main points and to give one or two reasons in support of that opinion. I propose to summarize my opinion on three main points as follows:

First, the whole history of Africa since 1800 shows that unless the European government prevents the acquisition of land by white settlers and

European companies and refuses to allow any compulsion of any kind upon the native to work for wages for Europeans, the economic interests of the native cannot be protected and sooner or later he becomes an economic slave.

Secondly, this has been recognized by governments themselves in Africa, and there are in fact two different systems of government actually in existence there, one of which reserves the land for the Africans and refuses to compel them to work for Europeans, while the other alienates the land to Europeans and seeks to compel the native to work on the Europeans' land. The first policy and system can be seen working in some of the British possessions on the west coast; the second in Kenya.

Thirdly, the history of the British west coast possessions shows that it is untrue that the exploitation of the land for the purposes of European industry cannot be effected if it is left to the natives and unless it is controlled by Europeans.

And now let me briefly give some facts in support of these opinions. The Congo atrocities, even

the most fervid economic imperialist admits today, were entirely due to the fact that the Congo native and his land were left to the unregulated exploitation of European industry and commerce. The instruments of that exploitation were not, I think, more heartless and savage than most Europeans; the root of the evil was not in the individuals but in the system which handed over primitive peoples to the complete economic control of people whose only business at the moment was to make profits. So too personally a slave-driver may be as good a man as, or even better than, an abolitionist, but the system of slavery will make him a curse to the human race. So too the Kenya settler, once he has been put into possession of the land, is driven by the necessity of making profits out of it to demand that the native shall be compelled to work on it, *i.e.* that the native shall economically be put completely in the settler's power.

The Congo obtained great notoriety as a flagrant example of the effects of economic imperialism in Africa. But the same system, in various or modified forms, was introduced into most of the

African possessions of European powers, and it has always had the same result. If, however, only the British possessions in Africa are considered, it will be found that two entirely different systems are now in operation, one on the east coast and one on the west. On the east large areas of the best land have been alienated to white settlers and European companies; the natives have been removed from the land which they previously occupied and in many places relegated to native reserves, while high taxation, administrative pressure, and even legislation are used to force them to work for wages. No one can pretend that conditions in Kenya are satisfactory. The natives are backward economically and native agriculture is actually discouraged in the interests of the white settlers; the Europeans are violently incensed at any opposition to their demands that the natives shall in some way or other, whether by direct compulsion, higher taxation, or cutting down their reserves, be made to work for them. On the west coast, exactly the opposite system is in operation. There, to all intents and purposes. the land has

been reserved for the natives; its alienation to and exploitation by Europeans and European companies have been forbidden; and consequently no one has ever demanded that the west coast African should be compelled to work for wages or that that wage earning is the only path to civilization.

It is a remarkable fact that from the earliest moment the difference between these two systems was clearly recognized by us and by our Government, and it was seen that the pivot of African policy is the land—the only way to protect the economic interests of the native is to reserve the land for his use; deprive him of his land, and you ensure his economic slavery. An interesting chapter on early land policy in Kenya in Mr. M'Gregor Ross's recently published book, *Kenya from Within,* shows that at first all dealings in land between Europeans and natives were forbidden, and that as late as 1897 the Government granted nothing more than a twenty-one year lease, and then only if the land was not "cultivated or regularly used by any native or native tribe." The evils now existing in Kenya date from

the time of Sir Charles Eliot's administration, when the theory was adopted that Kenya is colonizable and a white man's country. The regulations protecting the native in the occupation of land were swept away, and the natives were harried off the land wherever it found favour in the eyes of a settler or some company's agent.

The native of Kenya is on the road which leads to economic slavery. He has seen himself deprived of his land; he is harried by taxation; he is subject to compulsory labour; at any moment he may be fined or beaten by his chief if he does not agree to go out and work for low wages on a white man's farm; he has himself no legal rights or security of tenure in land. If this process is continued, if the settler gets what he now demands, *i.e.* complete political control of the native through so-called responsible government, the natives will become in fact the slaves of the few thousand white settlers. This will not be the result of any peculiar wickedness or brutality or cupidity on the part of the settlers; it is the inevitable result of the political and social and economic system for

which they stand. Slavery always has been and always will be the result of a system which expropriates a primitive people from the land in favour of Europeans and then gives to the Europeans, whose main business is the making of profits out of the land, political power over the natives. Such slavery has appeared in the old days in America; it has appeared in the Congo, in the Portuguese colonies, the French colonies, the German colonies, and in South Africa.

If the choice were between the economic exploitation of Africa under the Kenya system and economic stagnation with the land reserved for the natives, it seems to me that stagnation would be preferable to what is called "progress." But we are not confronted by any such choice. The history of the British west coast possessions is conclusive evidence that the economic development of the land is possible where it has been reserved for occupation by the native, and where the settler and the joint-stock company have been refused admission. The west coast of Africa is more fertile and more densely populated than the east, but

that would not explain the greater prosperity of the Gold Coast and Southern Nigeria in native hands as compared with Kenya in the hands of white capitalists and settlers, if it were true that the African is not capable of making an economic use of his land. The enormous development of the cocoa industry in the Gild Coast and Southern Nigeria gives the lie to that statement and "demonstrates," to quote a recent observer, "the intelligence and industry of the peasant." [1] And there is not the slightest reason to believe that the African in Kenya could not achieve what the African on the west coast has achieved, if he were given the chance.

"If he were given the chance"—those words bring me to my last point with regard to imperialism in Africa. The African has not yet been given a fair chance by the imperialist. As I have shown, even in 1885 the statesmen of Europe recognized that if civilization as well as trade was to be introduced into Africa, two things were necessary: the material interests of the native would have to be

[1] Allan M'Phee, *The Economic Revolution in British West Africa*, p. 27.

protected and he would have to be educated to understand and utilize "the blessings of civilization." Only in the British possessions on the west coast have the material interests of the natives been protected against the exploitation of the white man; but nowhere has any real attempt been made to fulfil the other admitted obligation of education. Until comparatively recent times, education was left almost entirely to the private enterprise of missionaries. Every one agrees that missionaries have done some splendid work in Africa, and not the least of their achievements has been their educational spade-work. But missionaries are primarily concerned with the religious beliefs and the immortal souls of Africans. These are important things, but the statesman or administrator who was concerned to fit the native to play his part in an Africa already invaded by imperialism and by the economic system and civilization of Europe would necessarily consider many other factors as equally or even more important. And even if the missionary or the private educationist were people into whose hands the education of the

Africans could properly be resigned, it is inconceivable that they would ever have the funds necessary for so gigantic an undertaking as the education of Africa.

It is no exaggeration to say that no European government in Africa has made a serious attempt to begin the education of the native so that eventually he might be capable of taking his place as a free man in the new economic and political society which Europeans have introduced into Africa. Out of an estimated revenue of nearly two million pounds in 1924, the Kenya Government allotted £44,000 to be spent on prisons and £37,000 on education. I deny that any European government in the twentieth century can claim to be civilized if it spends 20 per cent more on providing penal servitude and hard labour for its subjects than it does on providing them with education. The population of Kenya includes nearly 2,500,000 Africans, 36,000 Asiatics, and 10,000 Europeans. The Government spends £37,000 on the education of the 2,500,000 Africans and £25,000 on the education of 10,000 Europeans. The Phelps-

Stokes Report remarks that "the per capita expenditure for each European youth (in Kenya) is approximately £12, for the Asiatic youth about £2, and for the native practically negligible." Uganda, with a population of over three million and a revenue of about one million pounds, spends just over £20,000 on education.

It would be no use to multiply such figures. It is incontestable that the obligation, recognized in 1885, to educate their African subjects has not been fulfilled by any European State. The obligation can only be fulfilled when the governments undertake two responsibilities. They must provide schools and education in schools, but they must also deliberately encourage and educate the native to make the most economic use of his land, whether in growing food for his own consumption or products required by European industry or in stock and sheep farming. The economic imperialist, explicitly or implicitly, argues that the African belongs to an inferior race, and that this idea of educating him in order that he may play an independent part in the new economic and political

system is visionary. The answer to this argument can be given in a few words. There is no evidence that there is any truth in it. Everything that we have seen happen on the west coast of Africa goes to disprove it. At any rate, until the experiment has been made and has failed, this argument for the economic subjection of the native to the European is worthless.

It is quite possible that the economic and political system of the economic imperialist, the system now in existence in South Africa and Kenya, may be firmly established for some time and developed in some parts or even the greater part of Africa. Under that system all political power is in the hands of a small white minority. The greater part of the best land is held and exploited by the same white minority. The natives, forming an enormous majority of the population, are in part segregated in reserves, where they are left to themselves, provided that they grow nothing which can compete with the products grown by the whites; in part, they are forced, by administrative, legal, and fiscal measures, to supply such agricul-

tural or industrial labour as the whites may require on terms, in effect, imposed by the whites.

This system of political oligarchy and economic servitude is well developed in South Africa and partially developed in Kenya. When the Kenya settlers demand responsible government they are demanding that the native population should be delivered politically and economically into their hands. The system can, as I said, probably be firmly established for a time, for the rifles are in the hands of the minority. But it is certain in the end to lead to a terrible catastrophe. The revolt against the European's political domination and economic exploitation, which we have already seen in Asia, will inevitably be repeated in Africa. Indeed there are signs that it is already beginning. What the Japanese Government calls "dangerous thoughts" have already appeared in Kenya and the Japanese Government's weapon against them, deportation, has been resorted to. But all thoughts are really dangerous to governments like those of South Africa and Kenya, and thoughts about land

and labour cannot be deported; it is clear that they are spreading through Africa.

Western civilization and imperialism have to a great extent broken up and destroyed the African's tribal organization. Slowly through missionaries he is learning the "dangerous thoughts" which are also part of Western civilization. They will lead him to revolt if he awakens fully to find himself in economic servitude and political subjection, and a revolt of Africa against imperialism will be far more terrible than that of Asia. The only way of avoiding that catastrophe is to refuse to follow the road taken by imperialism in South Africa and now pointed out for us in Kenya, and to choose the road already traced for us in British West Africa.

V

THE INVERSE OF IMPERIALISM

In the previous chapters I have been discussing imperialism in Asia and Africa. The discussion has required an examination of the actions of Europeans and European States in those two continents during the last half century. I began by saying that imperialism was mainly an aspect of the conflict of civilizations, and the examination of facts has, I think, confirmed that view. The problems which we have had to discuss have not been those of racial or religious conflict, but of the effects of economic and political actions. Those actions are the direct result of the new civilization which arose in western Europe during the nineteenth century, and of the beliefs and desires which form the fabric and motive power in that civilization. The European and his State carried their civilization into Asia and Africa; they conquered those continents; they imposed upon them their own

economic and political system and many of their social standards; where they sowed they are now engaged in reaping.

But there is another aspect of the relations of Europeans to Africans and Asiatics which is a kind of inverse of imperialism, and which has nevertheless been greatly affected by the history of imperialism. It consists in the relations of Asiatics and Africans to white men in what may be called white men's countries. It embraces a variety of questions and problems of a very difficult and interesting nature. But the main problem can always be reduced to that of the presence or entrance of Asiatics or Africans in countries, inhabited by white men, where the social, political, and economic systems derive from nineteenth-century Western civilization.

If you consider this problem as a world problem, cropping up in many different places on the world's surface, you will find that it shows itself in three distinct forms. The first form in which it appears is happily not very common. It makes its appearance in countries inhabited by white men,

living under the fully developed conditions of Western civilization, where, for some historical reason, a large number of Asiatics or Africans are embedded and unabsorbed in the population. The United States of America, with its large negro population, is the place where the problem has most notably and acutely made itself felt in this form. Secondly, you find countries containing white men who feel themselves to be threatened by a large immigration of Asiatics and Africans and attempt to protect themselves against the growth of a non-European element in the population by laws forbidding or restricting immigration. The problem in this form becomes one of immigration and emigration and appears in the United States, in South Africa, in Kenya, and in Australia. But there is a third form and a very remarkable one in which the problem makes its appearance. South Africa was originally a black man's country. It is now inhabited by a large black and a much smaller white population. The white population now regards the country as a white man's country.

Their attitude towards the African is precisely the same as that of the American to the negro, their attitude towards the immigrant Indian is precisely the same as that of the American to the immigrant Japanese. In Kenya again you have the same situation developing in its incipient stages, a tiny European population, embedded in an enormous African population, claiming the country as "a white man's country," treating the African as an alien, and attempting to exclude the Asiatic.

I propose to treat these three forms of the problem to some extent separately. But they are all closely connected and all throw light upon one another. In the United States one can study the effects of the presence of a large non-European minority, with its own economic and cultural standards, living unabsorbed in a white population which politically, economically, and socially has a very highly developed type of Western civilization. One's judgment as to the goodness or badness of those effects should have an important influence upon one's opinion on the problems of

emigration or immigration, on the question whether the formation of non-European minorities in European countries should be encouraged or prevented. And even more obviously must the lessons to be learnt from the negro problem in America be pondered by any one who considers the situations now developing in South Africa and Kenya, and by those who claim that these are white men's countries. For if the negro minority is a problem in the States, the negro majority will prove to be the same problem, infinitely accentuated, if the same conditions, as between white and black, are created in South Africa and Kenya.

Let us first examine briefly the negro question in the United States. In 1920 there were in the United States about 10½ million negroes to about 95 million white people, *i.e.* the negroes formed about 11 per cent of the population. Between 1910 and 1920 the rate of increase in the negro population has been slightly greater than that in the white population. The distribution of the negro population varies enormously. In the Southern States there are nearly 9 million negroes,

and they form 27 per cent of the population; in the South Atlantic States they form over 30 per cent of the total. It is essential to keep these figures in mind. The negroes form a very large minority, so large in the South that, in many places, they would, under favourable conditions, exercise a powerful, if not predominating, influence in politics.

The negro population of the States originated, as every one knows, from the slaves, imported from Africa to work on the Southern plantations. In 1865, after the Civil War, slavery was abolished by the 13th Amendment to the Constitution. The Civil Rights Bill, 1866, the 14th Amendment, 1868, and the 15th Amendment, 1870, made the negroes full citizens of the United States and enfranchised them. Immediately an economic, political, and social problem confronted the States—a problem which has never been solved to this day. Here in the midst of a white population, living in a society highly organized on the lines of Western civilization, was a large homogeneous population of another race, on a dif-

ferent level of civilization, uneducated, recently freed from slavery, accustomed to a much lower economic standard of life. The economic problem consisted in the danger to the white man's standard of life from the competition of much cheaper negro labour. The political problem consisted in the fact that in many parts of the country a solid negro vote would be the deciding factor in politics, and that the white population was determined at all costs to maintain political ascendancy. The social problem arose from what are called the racial feelings of the whites, who refused to admit the negro to social equality, to allow him, for instance, to occupy the same railway carriages or tram-cars, to eat beside him in the same hotels and restaurants, or to sit beside him in the same theatres or cinemas.

In the sixty years since the abolition of slavery the situation has become more and more difficult. The negro population has more than doubled itself. It is now largely an educated population, though much still remains to be done in negro education. In culture it is no longer African, but

has adopted the standards and outlook of Western civilization. Economically it has become everywhere more capable of competing with the white population. These facts have roused a fierce antagonism in the whites in the economic, the political, and the social spheres. The negro finds himself denied economic equality; barred out of trades unions, or subjected to boycott and violence unless he confines his activities to certain localities; prevented from living anywhere but in negro quarters; in effect, refused entrance to professions and occupations. Politically, the negro has, by the manipulation of the laws of the individual States, by the connivance of the judiciary, and by violence, been disfranchised. Socially he occupies a position somewhat similar to that of the "untouchable" castes in India, with the privilege, in some places, of being lynched if at any time some mob of civilized white hooligans chooses to believe that he has touched a white woman.

Meanwhile, the negro population has also become, economically, politically, and racially more and more conscious. There is now a widespread

demand for equality in every sphere. Moreover, the large influx of negroes during recent years into the Northern States has made the problem, which used to be mainly confined to the South, in every sense a national problem. It has already led in many places to the most barbarous outbreaks of rioting and violence, and many Americans consider the negro question the most difficult and dangerous of any which confronts their country.

It will be seen that the problem, which was originally one of a conflict of civilizations, has now become complicated by racial antagonisms. The Americans had created in their midst a homogeneous body of persons alien to their own civilization. If, however, they had been able to absorb that alien body economically and politically, there would have been no negro racial problem, or, if there had been, it would have been mild and tractable. The conflict was originally economic and political; the racial passions were aroused only when the economic and political supremacy of the white man was challenged. The more the negro adopts the standards of European civilization,

thereby increasing his claim to economic, political, and social equality, the more violently does the "European" resist those claims, for he sees the threat to his supremacy increasing.

What are the possible solutions of this problem? It seems to be agreed that at present the white population is absolutely determined not to admit the negro to economic, political, or social equality. On the other hand, every year, as the negro population becomes more educated and "Europeanized," it will become more difficult to refuse the demand. Some people think that the issue will be a violent civil conflict of a particularly horrible kind. The alternatives to open conflict are three: (1) extermination of the negro, (2) segregation of the negro, (3) absorption of the negro. I must say a word or two about these alternatives.

Extermination of a population of ten or twelve millions under modern conditions presents no material difficulties, but unless the change in public opinion towards such measures, which has been notable since 1914, progresses much further it is not feasible. Mr. Gregory, in *The Menace of*

Colour, quoted Dr. R. W. Shufeldt, major in the Medical Department of the United States Army, as writing in his book *The Negro, A Menace to American Civilization:* "It would doubtless be a capital thing, if it could be done, to emasculate the entire Negro race and all its descendants in this country"; but even Dr. Shufeldt regretfully recognizes that "this scheme is impracticable." As a substitute for violent extermination, Dr. Shufeldt and others have proposed the repatriation of the entire negro population to Africa. It is, however, obvious that even this scheme is not practicable.

Extermination not being at present feasible, the second proposed alternative is segregation. A segregation policy is possible in various forms and degrees. The most extreme proposal is that a State should be reserved for the negro population, and that all negroes and no white men should reside there. The legal enforcement of such a system would meet with great opposition from the negroes themselves and from large numbers of employers in the South. It appears to be impra-

ticable. But it is quite possible to segregate the negro community less drastically under other forms. The basis of a segregation policy is the principle that it is impossible to assimilate the negroes politically, socially, or culturally in a community whose civilization is that of Western Europe. The negroes must be allowed to develop on their own lines as a social unit within the State. It will be noticed that in fact segregation, in this sense, is the existing policy. In fact, nearly everywhere the negro is compelled to live only in certain places; he is disfranchized; he is excluded from the ordinary social life of the community; his economic freedom is much more narrowly circumscribed than that of his white neighbour. The existing segregation of the negro is, however, enforced by non-legal or illegal methods. Some American observers have proposed that it shall be legally recognized, for instance, that the negroes should be disfranchized by law and treated as "wards of the nation" under a special Government department. Others again, including some distinguished negroes, have urged that the negroes

should separate themselves socially from the white population as much as possible and develop their own institutions and educational system, demanding only economic equality.

A segregation policy in any of its forms assumes that the negroes cannot be admitted at least to political and social equality, *i.e.* that they must always remain an alien body on an inferior status within the community. The third alternative is the exact opposite of segregation. It is assimilation. In its extreme form it recommends the maximum possible amount of intermarriage between the whites and blacks, and looks forward to rapid absorption of the negroes in the population. In its less extreme forms it aims at obtaining for the negroes complete political, economical, and social equality and the gradual assimilation of the negro with the white community.

It is rash, and perhaps impertinent, for an Englishman who has never visited the United States to venture any opinion upon this vast and difficult problem. I must, however, tentatively put forward one or two suggestions, because, I think, they

throw such valuable light on some of our own imperialist problems. It is clear that the presence of an unassimilated but rapidly developing negro population, denied political and economic equality, within a State organized and administered on the lines of Western civilization, is a great danger. The more the negroes develop, and the more they adopt the standards of the civilization of the rest of the community, the greater danger of a revolt. It is extremely doubtful whether any form of segregation is permanently possible where the minority is as large as that of the negroes in the United States; no educated homogeneous population of between ten and twenty millions will be satisfied to live in economic and political subjection within a modern State. There can be no real solution without assimilation, which must involve political and economic equality, but need not, I think, involve physical assimilation. But the path to this solution is barred by the racial passions of those in possession—by the whites. As long as the whites are determined to preserve their political and economic supremacy, as long as they feel to-

ward the negro as they do at the present time, so long will assimilation remain impossible. But if extermination, segregation, and assimilation are all impossible, then there is no solution to the problem at all except continual conflict and a drift to inevitable disaster.

The negro problem in the States is one of the best examples of the fact that racial conflicts are secondary to, and grow out of, political and economic conflicts, and more often than not out of conflicts of civilization. When the negroes were mere slaves there was no conflict of civilizations, no economic competition, no franchize question. The racial conflict grew out of enfranchizement, out of the westernization of the negro, out of this challenge to the economic and political supremacy of the white man. But once racial feelings are aroused in such a situation, they dominate it. They are so blind and irrational that it is not even possible to argue about them. They create dogmatic beliefs which resemble the dogmatic religious beliefs which caused the great religious wars of the past. One of these beliefs is that the negro be-

longs to an inferior race and is incapable of advancing to the same level of civilization as the white man. The belief may indeed be true, but at present there is no evidence for it, and it is so hopelessly entangled in racial passions and racial illusions that it is almost impossible for any one to consider it dispassionately. What evidence there is tends, I think, to show that the belief itself is a racial delusion. If the negro race is organically incapable of Western civilization, it is difficult to explain the emergence of men like Booker Washington and many other American negroes.

It is a great misfortune that this question of the cultural capacities of different races and peoples is so much obscured by prejudice and passion. For it is really one of the keys to the problems of race, civilization, and imperialism. The solution of the negro problem in the States, for instance, will depend ultimately upon the cultural capacity of the negro. There is also another series of questions of great importance which are almost always obscured by prejudice. They are questions connected with the effects of close contact between

different races and civilizations upon one another. We know practically nothing on these subjects, and the reason is that nearly everything written on them is pseudo-science, the product of racial or political bias. We do not know, for instance, what the real causes are which have produced the dying out of the natives of the Pacific Islands, which has followed the appearance of white men and the introduction of Western civilization. We do not know whether there is any truth in the often-repeated dogma that two types of civilization cannot exist in close contact, where there is political equality, without the lower type dragging the higher down to its own level. We have no real knowledge, I think, of the results of intermarriage between widely different races. Yet such knowledge is indispensable to a rational solution not only of the negro question in America, but of most of the problems which I have been discussing.

But now I must leave this negro question. It will be remembered that I began to deal with it as one of three forms in which the problem of the

inverse of imperialism presents itself, namely, the presence of Asiatics and Africans in countries organized on Western lines. It throws great light upon the other two forms of this problem. The second form in which it appears includes the great immigration controversies. A white population in California refuses to admit Japanese immigrants, in Kenya and South Africa Indian immigrants, in Australia Japanese immigrants. Now I do not think that any one who has studied the negro problem in America can doubt that the presence of a large, homogeneous, unassimilated population belonging to one race and civilization in a State where the majority of the population belongs to another race and civilization, creates a very difficult and dangerous situation. It is a situation which a wise statesman would do everything to avoid. I cannot myself believe that the world would be anything but a much worse world if there were two or three million Japanese embedded in the white populations of California or Australia, or several million Indians embedded in the black populations of East or South Africa.

No sane man would want to see the negro problem of America repeat itself, *mutatis mutandis*, as a Japanese problem in Australia. Yet that is what unrestricted immigration would almost inevitably lead to. Hence I am opposed to the creation of any such alien, unassimilated bodies anywhere in the world, whether they are Japanese in California and Australia, Indian in South Africa, or (and this is important) white in East Africa. But what is sauce for the goose must be sauce for the gander. The intense feelings created in Asiatics against immigration laws are a reaction against imperialism. The Asiatic has abstract justice on his side. Why should the white man have free ingress into Asia and Africa and yet debar the Asiatic from the "white man's country"? What possible right have a few thousand white men in Kenya to close the door against Indians, especially when the Indian population already greatly outnumbers the white? The answer to this plea of abstract justice is that, first, two wrongs do not make a right; and, secondly, that, if the world is to avoid the worst kind of racial conflicts, it must

somehow or other avoid the creation of these alien, unassimilated enclaves. I shall return to this question in my next chapter.

The third form in which this problem of inverted imperialism appears is the most remarkable of all. The best example of it is in South Africa. The Union of South Africa consists of the Cape, Natal, the Transvaal, and the Orange River Colony. Its total population is about seven millions, of which about 5½ millions are coloured and 1½ million are white. But closely connected with the Union are Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland, under the High Commissioner, and the mandated territory of German S. W. Africa. The coloured population of these territories is about one million, the white about 26,000. To the north of the Union lie Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesia, which enjoys what is called responsible government, has a native population of 770,000 and a white population of about 34,000. Northern Rhodesia has a native population of about one million and a white population of about 4000. Thus this solid block

of territory lying in South Africa, but within the British Empire, has a native or coloured population of nearly 8½ millions, a white population of just over 1½ million.

It is important to keep these figures of population in mind, because, as I shall show, the policy of the whites in South Africa is recreating there the negro problem of the United States on a colossal scale and in a form which must lead to appalling disaster. The presence of the white man in South Africa is due to the imperialist movement which I have discussed in previous chapters. Until the middle of last century South Africa still remained a black man's country. But in Cape Colony, Natal, the Transvaal, and the Orange Free State, unlike the rest of Africa, there was a Dutch and British colonizing movement as well as an imperialist movement. The colonists came to regard the territory conquered or occupied by them as a white man's country; they claimed and, everywhere except in Northern Rhodesia, they have won "independence" or "responsible government." The result is that a minority—in many

places a tiny minority—of white men have obtained complete political and economic dominion over a large majority of negroes.

Let us examine how the white minority has used that power in the Union of South Africa. It is startling to find that, if you read the speeches of the most patriotic South African in the Union Parliament, or the work of a moderate like Professor Brookes, *The History of Native Policy in South Africa*, or a book like *The Anatomy of African Misery* by such an extremist as the late Secretary of State for India, Lord Olivier, the negro problem of America is being recreated in South Africa, and is complicated and embittered there by imperialism. The white colonists began to treat the natives according to the methods of economic imperialism described in the previous chapter. The black man was racially inferior. His land, over large areas, was taken from him and sold or given to white farmers. When his manual labour was required on the white man's farm or in the white man's mine or factory, every form of compulsion or inducement was used in order to obtain

it. If land was left to him at all, it was a native or tribal reserve in which there was no security of tenure or title. Whenever the white man required more land or more labour, there was an agitation, often successful, to cut down or encroach upon the native reserves.

As soon as the white population won independence or responsible government, nothing stood in the way of the complete economic and political subjection of the negroes. The territory then became a white man's country, and the attitude of the white South African to the native became precisely that of the American to the negro. The same problem is repeating itself in South Africa in exactly the same form as that in which it has appeared in the States. There is the same economic situation, with the competition of cheap black labour against more expensive white labour, and the struggle to maintain an economic or industrial colour bar. There is the same social situation, the emergence of the educated native with a demand for economic, social, and political equality. There is the same political situation—the ques-

tion whether the Cape franchize, which gives a vote to natives in Cape Colony, shall be extended or abolished; and the problem of how, if natives are to be given the vote, their use of it may be rendered politically ineffective.

Not only is the same situation developing in South Africa as in North America, but the same solutions are being suggested for the same problem. To keep education and a knowledge of Western civilization from the native is seen to be impossible; to harness him to the machinery of the European economic system and to keep him an obedient and primitive savage is extremely difficult; to make him a Christian and tell him that all men are equal is not a very good preparation for turning him into a contented economic slave. The white population of South Africa already hears the black man knocking at the three entrances to his house—the economic door at the back, the political door at the side, and the social door in front. The sound is unpleasant; it is terrifying. The white South African, who has only heard the first gentle tapping, is beginning to go

through the same mental gymnastics as the white American who has already heard a good loud knock. It is true that no one has suggested the extermination of the Africans in South Africa, or even their deportation. Perhaps it is vaguely felt that if Africans are to be allowed to live anywhere it must be in Africa, and in any case there would be difficulties in the way of, say, the 33,000 white men in Southern Rhodesia deporting the 770,000 natives. But if extermination or deportation is not possible, there is always the blessed word "segregation." Segregation is becoming a kind of panacea and "open-sesame" in the mouths of South African politicians. General Hertzog is in favour of segregation, and so is Professor Brookes, and so is the Rev. Arthur Shearley Cripps. It is true that they do not all mean the same thing when they use the same word. Some of them mean by segregation the complete separation of white and black in different areas under different administrations and different laws. But people like Professor Brookes deny that this is possible. Professor

Brookes's "segregation" is defined by him as a policy of differentiation. He argues that if the native is given complete equality and identity of status with the white man, the result will be deep-seated hatred of black by white, and if the native is subordinated to the white man, the result will be deep-seated hatred of white by black. He argues that the only way out is a policy of "differential development." He proposes the establishment of larger neutral areas in addition to the present white and black areas, the creation of a separate system of local officers for natives, the recognition of unwritten native law in all courts, the gradual establishment of a National Council, and the imposition of heavy penalties on Europeans "having immoral relations with native women."

Professor Brookes has written an admirable book on the native question in South Africa, but it leaves me in considerable doubt whether his proposals are in any way adequate for a solution. The alternatives to segregation are, as in America,

a policy of equality and identity, which the white population would never agree to, or a policy of drift. That South African statesmen realize the urgency and difficulty of the problem can be seen from the following remarks made by the High Commissioner of South Africa in a speech in London on November 2, 1927:

> Moments arose when they thought in South Africa that they were on the brink of some huge catastrophe, and when they put the question to themselves, "Are we to be shattered or are we to be more closely linked than ever before?" When those moments arose, they went below the artificial surface and got to the living cause of the troubles and tried to heal them. In that spirit they were now approaching one of the biggest problems which could face a community consisting of white and black. That was the native question. The problem was huge and difficult, and was threatening their very nationhood. Some people advised them that, on account of its hugeness, they should leave it alone. No policy of drift had ever paid them. They were too few in South Africa to allow that to be their policy. In solving the native question there must be hardship inflicted on whites as well as blacks. They were going to solve the question, and to solve it on the right lines—on lines dictated

by the highest conception of fairness, equity, and justice to both white men and to natives. All that they in South Africa asked was that here indulgence and patience should be shown.

I think I have made it clear that the native problem in South Africa is a repetition of the negro problem in America. Both of them result from an attempt to establish a society of white men on lines of Western civilization, with an economic and political and educational system on European models, and within that society to maintain a large black population in a condition of complete economic and political subjection. The attempt cannot succeed. It is impossible under those conditions to keep from the black population the knowledge of Western civilization, and the power which goes with that knowledge. Once it has got that knowledge and power, it will refuse to accept a position of inferiority and subjection.

If the position in America is difficult already, where the negroes form 11 per cent of the population, what is it going to be in Africa, where within the Union the natives form over 78 per cent of

the population and in the whole of British South Africa 85 per cent? It is inconceivable that under modern conditions 8½ million black men will consent to live in permanent economic and political subjection to 1½ million white men.

One might have expected that the lessons of America and South Africa would have taught the European some caution and wisdom. But on the east coast of Africa in Kenya you will find today a white population of about 10,000 which has thrust itself into a black population of nearly 2½ million, claiming that the territory is a white man's country and demanding that they shall be given what they call Responsible Government—which means that the land and its native inhabitants shall be handed over to the unfettered control of a few thousand white planters. Here is a proposal to place 2½ million natives in permanent economic and political subjection to a white population of 10,000, to a few thousand Europeans many of whom regard Kenya not as their home, but as a place in which they may make sufficient money in order to retire to England. And the

present Conservative Government, one hears, looks favourably upon this demand. With the negro problem staring them in the face, and the High Commissioner of South Africa talking of the native problem there as leading them to "the brink of some huge catastrophe," these people propose deliberately to hurl themselves into a similar abyss.

The moral of the facts considered in this chapter is obvious, and can be summed up in a few words. The inclusion within a homogeneous white population of large numbers of Asiatics or Africans or the inclusion within homogeneous Asiatic or African populations of large numbers of Europeans must under present conditions lead to a most dangerous situation. It invariably entails the economic and political subjection of the Asiatics and Africans. But the time when such subjection was acquiesced in has passed, and there will inevitably result a bitter conflict between the subject and dominant parts of the population. Where those conditions already exist, as in America and the Union of South Africa, it is extremely

difficult to see how disaster can be avoided. But that is all the more reason for refusing to allow the same conditions, in an aggravated form, to be established in such places as Kenya and Northern Rhodesia.

VI

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND A SYNTHESIS OF CIVILIZATIONS

In my previous chapters I have tried to analyse the history of imperialism and of the inverse of imperialism. It has appeared from that analysis that the problems involved arise from a conflict of civilizations, from the relations between the peoples who have evolved Western civilization and the peoples of Asia and Africa. They are problems of international policy in the widest sense, for their solution depends upon a stable and smooth adjustment of the political and economic relations of peoples, nations, States, and governments from Peking to Peru.

There are two opposite and contradictory systems by which international relations may be regulated and adjusted, and we happen to be living in a transition age in which the world has

not yet made up its mind to choose the one or the other of these systems. The first is the respectable and time-honoured system of individualism. The world of nations is a world of sovereign and independent States, individual and omnipotent units of Statehood, each pursuing through an imaginary international vacuum its own sacred interests. Unfortunately the real world is not an international vacuum, and when from time to time the paths of two of these omnipotent units cross, the question whose interests are to prevail is settled ultimately by the question whose omnipotence is the more omnipotent. The system is therefore individualistic and under it the ultimate arbiter is power and force. It is the system under which imperialism attempted to regulate the relations between Europe and the rest of the world. Each European State pursued its own interests in Asia and Africa, as an isolated unit, up to the point at which it could no longer impose its will upon the subject peoples and the other States of Europe. We have seen in previous chapters what have been the results of this system.

The other system is based upon a completely different conception of the world of nations. It is no longer a world of isolated units moving majestically along their own orbits; it is a world of States, nations, and peoples, all closely interrelated parts of a vast international society with its own economic and political organization. No part of this whole has either the right or in fact the power to pursue its own interests without reference to the interest and will of the other parts. The settlement of differences and the adjustment of relations are to be made by discussion, compromise, or international adjudication. This system is, of course, not yet in existence. The observant eye can discern it beginning to grow in shadowy and distorted growths all through the nineteenth century; today a more solid, if rather rickety, framework has been built for it in the League of Nations. In this chapter I propose to consider what contribution the international system for which the League stands can make to those problems of civilization which imperialism has failed to solve.

There are three separate questions to be considered: the relation of Western civilization to Asiatic peoples, the relation of Western civilization to primitive peoples, and the peculiar problems discussed in the previous chapter. Let me begin with Asia.

It is significant that in the Covenant of the League the Great Powers of Europe for the first time implicitly acknowledged the failure of imperialist policy in Asia and vaguely traced the lines of a new policy of international co-operation. They laid it down that there are "peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world," and that the "well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization." The tutelage of such peoples is to be entrusted to advanced nations and is to be "exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League." Among the peoples still in their minority certain peoples of Asia are explicitly distinguished from the primitive peoples of Africa. There are certain Asiatic communities, the Great Powers said, which "have

reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory."

As every one knows, the Allied Powers which signed the Treaty immediately broke the pledges given by them in this section. The Mandatories in Syria, Palestine, and Iraq were selected without consulting, sometimes against, the wishes of the communities. Mandated territory has been treated as part of empires and the pledge with regard to advice and assistance has been ignored. In Syria the French have subjected an unwilling people by the ruthless use of French armies. Nevertheless I regard this clause as a very remarkable and important international pledge. For the first time in history it is publicly recognized that there is an alternative policy to imperialism in Asia and that the relation of European States

to Asiatic peoples is a matter of concern to all the nations and States of the world.

No one with any knowledge of history can regard with equanimity the present position in Asia. Asiatic peoples have a long and difficult path to travel before they extricate themselves from the morass in which imperialism has left them. The economic forces in Western civilization are so powerful and insistent that nothing can prevent them from impinging upon and to some extent moulding the lives of people in every quarter of the globe. A modification of Eastern civilizations —in other words an adjustment of the civilizations of Asia to that of western Europe—is inevitable. If the adjustment is to be peaceful and beneficent, somehow or other the peoples of Asia will have to learn both how to pass from imperialistic subjection to complete independence and how to use themselves the political and economic machinery or forces which Western civilization has given to the world.

I am not one of those who believe that there are inherent superiorities and inferiorities in different

races and peoples. On the other hand, I do not believe that this adjustment, this radical modification of ancient habits and antique institutions and immemorial civilizations, is easy of accomplishment. Europeans themselves find it no easy matter to use the parliamentary institutions of democracy and to control, in the public interests, the economic forces in modern industry and finance. The task is infinitely harder for peoples like the Persians and the Chinese. It must be remembered that in Asia the effects of imperialism have been largely disintegrating. Europeans and their State have been mainly concerned with pursuing their own economic interests, and the nature of their political control has, except in India, been determined by this pursuit. In the process they have destroyed large parts of the framework of Asiatic society, and since the process was imposed from without, nothing was built up to take the place of the parts destroyed. You may see today many places in Asia in which the ancient cement which kept society together has been destroyed by imperialism and the violent introduction of Western

civilization, and politically and economically the country is simply chaotic. It would be silly to pretend that in such circumstances it will be an easy thing for the peoples themselves to find the right path to political and economic stability or for them to learn how to control the enormous, complicated powers and forces which have been placed in men's hands by Western civilization.

It is here that the system of international relations, adumbrated in the League, might be of immense service. That system implies, as I have said, that States, races, and nations are not isolated units, each pursuing its own sacred interests, but closely interrelated parts of international society, of a world society. In such a society the forcible subjection of one people, say Persia, by others, say Britain and Russia, in the economic interests of Britain and Russia, becomes an absurdity and an anachronism. The interests of peoples, like the Syrians or the Arabs, and therefore the Persians and the Chinese, who are "not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world," become a concern of the whole

society of nations, a sacred trust of civilization. Nations in this condition are no longer to be handed over as "spheres of interest" to the political control and economic exploitation of some powerful European State; they are to be recognized as independent nations with the right to obtain from the League of Nations administrative advice and assistance which will educate their peoples in the art of government so that they may be capable themselves of dealing with these strenuous conditions of the modern world.

The system here described, which you may read in the 22nd article of the Covenant of the League, is not the dream of some mere idealist. It is the declared policy of the first statesmen of Europe, such brilliant and practical politicians as Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau. It has been signed, sealed, and delivered by them, and it has, one understands, the approval of Signor Mussolini. If it were honestly applied, adapted, and accepted, it would, I believe, rapidly wipe out many of the most disastrous effects of imperialism and would be of immense assistance in the

dangerous transition stage which is now opening in Asia.

There is a great deal to be said in favour of the mandate system. But it would have, I repeat, to be honestly applied and adapted to the different circumstances of different nations. The dishonest application of the mandate system in the Near East by France and Britain has made it practically certain that no independent State in Asia would voluntarily accept an individual European State as mandatory. But it might still be possible for the League itself to confer the benefits of the mandatory system on nations now in the difficult position of China and Persia. Disinterested administrative and economic advice and assistance might be of enormous service in those countries. Asiatic nations in the past have often voluntarily enlisted the help of individual Europeans and Americans to reorganize their finances, their army and navy, or their educational system. There is no reason why Mr. Shuster, if he had been given a fair chance by Russia and Britain, should not have done for

Persia and her finances what Cromer did for Egypt. The imperialist is inclined to overestimate the value of good administration and sound and honest finance, but those who are against imperialism should not go to the opposite extreme and underestimate them. The kind of administrative and economic system which imperialism at its best developed in India and Egypt conferred immense material benefits upon those countries, and under modern conditions, which are the results of Western civilization, life becomes hardly tolerable unless there is a fairly high standard of political and financial stability and efficiency. Imperialism deserves full credit for the stability and efficiency which often accompanied its dominion; unfortunately, as we have seen, the imperialist Powers, by their blindly selfish pursuit of their own economic interests, stultified themselves and raised up against themselves an opposition which eventually makes even stability and efficiency of government impossible. The lesson of all this is that, if Asia is to avoid many years of wretched strife and dis-

order, it will have to learn for itself the secrets of stable government, honest administration, and sound finance.

I repeat that peoples in the conditions now obtaining in China and Persia will not find it easy to learn those secrets. But a League of Nations which was prepared honestly to act in accordance with the pledges of the Covenant and in which Asia had some confidence might be of great assistance to them. I can imagine it supplying experts, administrators, advisers, and advisory commissions; they would be free from the kind of suspicion which naturally attached to similar "advisers" provided by the great imperialist Powers. The financial assistance which the League gave to Austria opens other vistas. The financing of Asiatic countries and the economic penetration of them, which is an inevitable result of Western civilization, present most difficult problems which are always of an international nature and can only be settled by international action. In the past, under the imperialist system, the agreements have been made by international financial groups, often

with the various imperialist Governments standing behind their nationals in the background but taking an active part in the transactions. The Four Power Consortium and the Five Power Consortium in China were typical examples of this system. It was radically unsound because the groups were concerned not with the economic interests of the Chinese but with their own financial interests, and it was into their hands that financial control passed.

A League of Nations, honestly anxious to put into practice the principles enunciated in Article 22 of the Covenant, would be in a strong position for giving financial advice and assistance to Asiatic countries and determining fairly under what conditions loans for productive purposes should be made. There is no reason to believe that a railway might not be as useful to the inhabitants of Samarkand or Honan as it is to those of Guildford in Surrey; but imperialism made railways a curse to Asia because it made them the spear-head of political subjection and economic exploitation. As things are, railways and the like do not provide

themselves and grow spontaneously from the economic soil in the undeveloped countries of the world in the same way as they do in those places where Western civilization is indigenous. They have always raised, and will for long continue to raise, delicate international questions in which financial security may shade off into political control and economic subjection. No financiers or groups of financiers, no single State or consortium of States, can deal with these questions in such a way as to make the interests of the undeveloped country a principal consideration and therefore to win and retain the confidence of its inhabitants. But that might well be achieved by a League of Nations which was really determined to carry out in Samarkand, Persia, and China the fine promises which it has made in Versailles and Geneva.

I would go even farther than this. The breakdown of government in China is not a good thing for its inhabitants, and it is doubtful whether many of them desire or enjoy it. It is in some respects a legacy of imperialism, and Europeans and European governments are not without responsi-

bility for its continuance and, certainly, for its magnitude. Rival tuchuns have for long been pawns in the imperialist policy of Japan and other Powers, and the arming of these military anarchists and often their military advisers and commanders-in-chief is provided by Japan and Europe. This kind of situation is almost certain to arise in other Asiatic countries as long as the revolt against Europe and imperialism continues in its present form. The imperialist cure, intervention in its old forms, is always in the end worse than the disease. But the League of Nations, if it were free from the taint and suspicion of imperialism, and if it were determined to act up to the principles of Article 22, might intervene in another sense and might effectually help the Chinese to struggle free from anarchy. It could not establish a stable government in China; that is a thing which the Chinese must do for themselves; but it could remove those obstacles to stability which are the result of international action and foreign intervention. It could deal with the traffic in arms, the backing of rival Chinese generals by outside

Powers and other methods now adopted for fishing in troubled waters, the customs question, foreign settlements, and the rights of foreigners. It might even mediate between rival governments.

In these suggestions I am aware that I have got on to perilous ground. Many people would say that a League, acting in this way, would be interfering in the internal affairs of independent States. My answer is that the system of international relations for which the League stands, a system which, as I said, implies that States, nations, and peoples are closely interrelated parts of international society, requires considerable modifications in the ancient theory and practice of independence and sovereignty. Statesmen and peoples may continue to refuse to make those modifications; they may cling to an international system which does not fit the world in which we are actually living; but, if so, they will pay the inevitable penalty of anachronism, of trying to force the twentieth century into clothes which were made for the seventeenth.

However, one must admit that this is a difficulty which is certain to hamper League action in Asia for many years to come, for Asia is now a Continent of sovereign and independent States. The difficulty does not arise in quite the same form in Africa. There the problem is the treatment of primitive peoples who have been subjected to the rule of European States. The treatment of such peoples, as I have shown, was as early as 1885 publicly declared to be the concern of all nations. The principle was reaffirmed with even greater clearness after the war, at least in so far as it applied to the inhabitants of the German colonies. Article 22 of the Covenant includes the peoples of Central Africa among those who are "not yet able to stand alone under the strenuous conditions of the modern world" and whose "well-being and development form a sacred trust of civilization." The tutelage of the inhabitants of the German colonies in Africa is to be entrusted to a mandatory on behalf of the League. There is to be no question here of independent nations,

but the mandatory is to be entrusted with the administration and with the well-being and development of the native population.

The mandate system has not been applied with less subterfuge and hypocrisy in Africa than in Asia. It is clearly intended by some people to be used as a cloak of fine phrases to cover the nakedness of the older imperialism, to continue the subjection and exploitation of Africa under the new name of a sacred trust instead of that of a Joint Stock Company. Nevertheless, as in the case of Asiatic mandates, I consider Article 22 of the Covenant to be potentially an instrument of great power. I propose briefly to examine how it might be applied and developed in order really to safeguard the well-being of the Africans and help them to adapt themselves to Western civilization.

There can be no doubt what the words of Article 22 mean. They mean that the mandated territories in Africa shall be administered *primarily* in the interests of the native inhabitants, that the trustee of their interests is the League, and that the League shall employ a particular State to

carry out the terms of that trust. If this system is to be honestly applied, the mandatory has no right to treat the mandated territory as part of its empire; it is simply a trustee on behalf of the League which has itself declared itself to be a trustee on behalf of civilization. It is fantastic that, in such a position, a mandatory should object, as Great Britain has done, to supplying information with regard to the administration of mandated territory to the League or its organs. What would we think in national life of a trustee who refused to disclose what it was doing to carry out a trust?

If the terms of Article 22 are to be carried out, the sovereignty in mandated territory must be in the League. The Mandates Commission of the League must work out the general principles of government to be applied in Africa and these, when approved by the Council and Assembly, should be obligatory on the Mandatory Power. The main work of the Mandates Commission should be to watch over the carrying out of these principles in practice, helping mandatories with

advice and experience, investigating charges, reporting to the Council on all cases where the mandatory is not fulfilling the obligations of Article 22. The general lines on which the relations of the mandatory to the League Commission and to the League Council should be regulated are quite easy to define. No one who has administered a district in a Crown Colony, without responsible government, can have any doubt that the British system can be applied to the mandatory system. The League is to the mandatory what the Colonial Office is to the local government; it should lay down the general principles of administration, but should interfere as little as possible in the actual details of administration. The native inhabitants should have the same rights of petition and appeal as they have in a British colony; *i.e.* from the district to the provincial officer, from the provincial officer to the Governor, and from the Governor to the Mandatory Government, and, finally, from that Government to the League Commission. The Commission should have full powers of investigation, and should re-

port to the Council only where it considered that the local government was not acting in accordance with mandatory principles.

As to what those principles should be, there can be little doubt to any one who has studied the facts given in Chapter IV. The League must apply and develop in mandated territory the system of administration already existing in some parts of British West Africa. It should be a principal task of the League Commission to work out such a system, in fact a code of native rights for Africa. Three things are, as we have seen, absolutely essential, if the interests of the natives are to be safeguarded and they are to be helped to adapt themselves to Western civilization, to stand alone under the strenuous conditions of the modern world. First they must be assured of access to the land. That means that the Government must set its face against the alienation of land to Europeans and its exploitation on a large scale by European planters or joint-stock companies, while at the same time it must do everything in its power to encourage and improve native agriculture. Sec-

ondly, the native must be assured of economic freedom in so far as his labour is concerned. Forced labour, under any form, must be prohibited; but this, by itself, is not enough. The Commission will have to study the whole question of native taxation and other forms of administrative pressure in relation to native labour. It will have to devise means of preventing the use of taxation as an instrument against the economic freedom of the native. Thirdly, the native must be educated.

The first two requirements are not really difficult to satisfy. The broad outlines of a code of native rights for land and labour have been already drawn by the experience of the last fifty years of imperialism. The problem of education, of helping the African to adapt himself to and use Western civilization, of developing his capacities and his institutions, so that eventually he may stand on his own feet, politically, economically, and socially a free man—that problem is more complicated and more obscure. The difficulty is that we have to start from the beginning, for

hitherto practically nothing has been done by imperialist governments. But if the development of the natives of mandated territory is really a sacred trust of civilization and the League is the trustee, then it is incumbent upon the League to take immediate steps towards the carrying out of its trust. It is a problem of education in the widest sense. The end in view is an African population, with its own institutions and civilization, capable of making the most economic use of the land, able to understand Western civilization and control the forces which it has let loose upon the world, governing itself through organs of government appropriate to its traditions and its environment. One of the most important and urgent tasks of the Mandates Commission should be the study of this problem, and in doing so it might well enlist the help of the League's Committee on Intellectual Co-operation. It should of course associate the Mandatory Governments with its work. It should gradually work out a programme of practical measures for a comprehensive education of the populations in the League's charge, and it

should not be too timid to try experiments. As the programme is worked out, it should, if approved by the Council or Assembly, be put into operation by the Mandatory Governments.

This is a rough sketch of the mandate system, as it would be, if honestly applied in Africa. It is a good example of the conception of international society in a League of Nations as opposed to that of imperialism. Under imperialism Europe imposed its civilization upon Africa by force, or rather it imposed just so much of it as served the interests of the powerful imperialist interests and States of Europe. It destroyed everything alien to itself, in the lives and institutions of Africans, which did not serve its own material interests. The League, in Africa as in Asia, would, on the other hand, work for a synthesis rather than for a conflict and destruction, domination and subjection, of civilizations. It would develop and find a place for African civilization within the society of nations; it would deliberately help the African to make his own those parts of Western civiliza-

tion which he was capable of adapting to his own needs and environment.

The League, acting in this way in Africa, would be the antithesis of imperialism. It would indeed be a menace to imperialism, as perhaps the imperialists themselves realize. For if the mandate system were really carried out in the way sketched by me throughout what were once the German colonies, it would have an immense repercussion in the rest of Africa. There seems to be no reason in the scheme of the universe to believe that the inhabitants of Tanganyika are a sacred trust of civilization, and those of Kenya by destiny the economic slaves of white men, and it is inconceivable that a slave society in Kenya should be able to live side by side with a prospering and developing native society in Tanganyika. The interests and development of the inhabitants of Africa either are or are not a sacred trust of civilization; if they are, and if they are treated as such by the League through its mandates, then sooner or later the mandate system will have to be

extended to all the "possessions" of imperialist Powers in Africa.

There remains for discussion the third question, namely, the relation of the League, to those peculiar problems which I dealt with in my last chapter. The League stands for a synthesis instead of a conflict of civilizations, for tolerance and co-operation, for an international society of inter-related rather than of warring parts, for the adjustment of relations and the settlement of international disputes by discussion, compromise, and adjudication. These principles must determine its attitude towards those difficult cases of inverse imperialism and of immigration and emigration. No one who wishes to see international society develop on League lines can possibly believe that the presence of the negro population in North America is a good thing for the negroes themselves, for the United States, or for the world. He would therefore be opposed to anything which might create a similar situation elsewhere in the world. The idea that South Africa or Kenya can be permanently converted into a white man's

country is a dream of political insanity. The insanity of those who dream will be visited upon the heads of their children in the third and fourth generation. The League should steadily set its face against the creation of alien enclaves, whether they be Asiatic or African in North America, or white in Africa.

At present the League can do little towards obtaining assent to a sound policy in such matters. Where the evil has already been done, it has no *locus standi*, and indeed the evil in those cases is so deep-seated and obstinate that a satisfactory solution is not immediately attainable. In other words, the League cannot intervene in a problem like the negro problem of America or the native problem in South Africa. In Africa, however, in mandated territory, it can take steps to see that the history of South Africa is not repeated. It might in this way make the continuance of the East African policy in Kenya and other nonmandated territories actually impossible, and thus lay the foundations of a rational policy of "Africa for the Africans." Finally, there is an opening for

League action and League principles in those questions of immigration and emigration which arise between States. Here the League has a *locus standi* for mediation. It can work for the settlement of disputes by discussion and adjudication on principles of justice and sound policy. If the facts and arguments which I have put forward are true, there can be little dispute as to what those principles should be. The creation of alien enclaves by immigration must always be an extraordinarily dangerous political experiment and should be discouraged. But this is a principle which must be applied universally or not at all. If in this sense Europe is to be for the Europeans, and America for the Americans, and Australia for the Australians, Asia must be for the Asiatics, and Africa for the Africans. And that will mean the end of imperialism, the end of conflict, and the beginning of a synthesis of civilizations.

THE END

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